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WHY EXAMPLES? TOWARDS MORE
BEHAVIORALLY-INTELLIGENT REGULATION
Yariv Brauner*
Tax regulation authors habitually infuse regulations with explanatory
examples. These examples are viewed favorably by both the government
that encourages their drafting and the taxpayers who regularly rely on such
examples to assist them in dealing with the notoriously complex tax rules.
Despite the ubiquity of these examples, there is no published guidance for
their drafting, their use, or their interpretation. The first original
contribution of this article is the exposition and classification of the
advantages and deficiencies in the current use of examples in tax
regulations. This article is the first to question the rationale behind the
ubiquitous use of examples in tax regulations. The article uses data
collected by original surveys of expert tax professionals and government
employees involved in drafting tax regulations. The second original
contribution of this article is the explanation of the appeal of these
examples among tax experts, and the potential hazards of the examples
despite this apparent appeal. This analysis uses insights from behavioral
science, and particularly from the study of cognitive biases, to explain, for
example, how anchoring via an example could shift the focus of a
regulatory rule and alter the boundaries of the law in inappropriate or
unfair ways. Finally, relying on this analysis, the article proposes - the
third original contribution - a better-informed approach to the writing of
examples in tax regulations.
.Hugh Culverhouse Eminent Scholar Chair in Taxation & Professor of Law, Levin College
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I. INTRODUCTION
"No rules exist, and examples are simply life-savers answering the
appeals of rules making vain attempts to exist."
Breton's statement, written by this founder of the Surrealist movement
almost a century ago, serves as an apt counterpoint to the ubiquitous use
and prominence of examples, formalized in regulations, in the practice of
tax law in the United States. This article is about the interplay between rules
and examples and the surprising legal void in which they operate.
Tax law is often viewed as surreal - being extensive, complex,2 and
very political.3 Few endeavor to master its intricacies, yet even these few
enthusiasts are often stumped by the rules. It is fitting therefore that
statutory tax rules are accompanied by voluminous regulations that purport
ANDRt BRETON, SURREALISM AND PAINTING 35 (Simon Watson trans., Icon eds.,
1972) (emphasis added). The quoted text, complementary to Breton's Surrealist manifesto,
was written in 1928 in his introduction to his essay illustrating how painting could be based
in Surrealism.
2 See, e.g., NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2014),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-
One.pdf (repeatedly mentioning the complexity of U.S. tax law and the inability of an
underfunded Internal Revenue Service (Service) to provide appropriate service that would
secure taxpayer rights in light of this complexity as the most serious problem in the U.S. tax
system). For critique and related discussion of the complexity of tax law, going back
essentially to its enactment, see, e.g., DAvID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1986); Walter J. Blum, Simplification ofthe Federal Income Tax Law,
10 TAX L. REV. 239 (1954); Robert B. Eichholz, Should the Federal Tax Be Simplified?, 48
YALE L.J. 1200 (1939); Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Income Tax Simplification: The Political
Process, 34 TAX L. REV. 27 (1978); Randolph E. Paul, Simplification ofFederal Tax Laws,
29 CORNELL L.Q. 285 (1944); Sidney I. Roberts et al., A Report on Complexity and the
Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REv. 325 (1972); Deborah Schenk, Simplification for Individual
Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121 (1989); Stanley S. Surrey,
Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail,
34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 673 (1969); Sidney 1. Roberts et al., A Report on Complexity
and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325 (1972).
3 As well put by Cicero in his famous statement: "Taxes are the sinews of the state."
Stanley L. Winer, Paola Profeta & Walter Hettich, The Political Economy of Taxation,
OXFORD BlBLIOGRAPHIES (2013), http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0083.xml (emphasis added).
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to make the law more accessible.4 These Treasury (tax) Regulations are,
however, not so simple to follow themselves, being only slightly less formal
articulations of the law than their statutory bases. The formality of the
regulations goes beyond matters of design and language, since they are
generally given strong deference by the courts, 5 and are widely accepted in
practice as governing norms, although they merely reflect the government's
interpretation of what the law is.6 Tax regulations are still highly complex,
so their authors have long adopted a habit of infusing them with examples.7
This practice seems desirable, almost obvious, at first glance, purporting to
make the law clearer and more universally standard; yet a second glance
exposes the difficulties that this practice presents, difficulties largely
obscured by the intuitive appeal of examples, and hence easy for both the
nonexpert to miss and for the more sophisticated user to exploit. This article
is the first to shed light on the less desirable consequences of the extensive
use of examples in tax regulations, exposing the ambiguity they introduce
4 The Treasury Regulations are located in Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.). Final and Temporary tax regulations are announced as Treasury Decisions in the
Federal Register, Internal Revenue Bulletin, and the Cumulative Bulletin. See Tax Code,
Regulations and Official Guidance, INTERNAL REVENUE SERv. (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.irs.gov/privacy-disclosure/tax-code-regulations-and-official-guidance.
See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44
(2011) (interpreting the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) students exemption);
BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs
¶ 110.5 (2d ed. 2005). But see Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MiNN. L. REv. 1537 (2006) (challenging the
desirability of the extent of such deference).
6 Treasury Regulations are general pronouncements of the government's
(administrative) interpretation of federal tax laws. They are the highest order of such
pronouncements in the United States. They are promulgated by the Treasury Department
(and its agency, the Service, pursuant to the statutory authority (and command) of Internal
Revenue Code (Code) section 7805(a) to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title" As a matter of norm, regulations typically appear first in the form
of proposed regulations, sometimes accompanied by Temporary Regulations (which have
the effect of final regulations, albeit for a limited, prescribed, period of three years), so that
the public can comment on them prior to finalization. I.R.C. § 7805(e).
7 This practice is amplified by the increasing use of regulations in cases where other
government proclamations had been issued in the past. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr.,
Why Not Revenue Rulings? 105 TAX NOTES 1305 (Mar. 14, 2016) (arguing that the supposed
focus on regulations has not increased regulation production and has either caused or
accompanied a reduction in general guidance because of the decline in revenue rulings). See
also Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Reflections on the Regulations Process: "Do the Regulations
Have to Be Complex" or "Is Hyperlexis the Manna of the Tax Bar?" 51 TAX NOTES 1441
(June 17, 1991) (arguing that many forces have converged to lead to voluminous, complex
regulations, including the active participation of the bar in overly aggressive tax planning, to
which Congress and the Service have responded with increasingly detailed anti-tax-
avoidance rules).
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to tax law in the United States; explaining their policy-defying potential
when used, as they are at present, in an uneducated manner; and promoting
a more informed, nuanced use and interpretation of such examples.8
An example (no pun intended, here or elsewhere in this article) may
illustrate the legal challenge presented by regulatory examples: employees
are generally permitted to enjoy untaxed employer provided coffee,
doughnuts, and soft drinks.9 This rule is found in an example in the fringe
benefits regulation that generally permits employees to enjoy certain
employer provided perks without inclusion of the value of such perks in
their gross income, namely without paying tax. 10 Only de minimis fringe
benefits enjoy such treatment, defined as "any property or service the value
of which is (after taking into account the frequency with which similar
fringes are provided by the employer to the employer's employees) so small
as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively
impracticable."' 1 Treasury Regulation section 1.132-6 (1992) interprets this
rule, discussing first the frequency element, then clarifying that if the
benefit is reducible to' cash it should always be taxed.12 Treasury Regulation
section 1.132-6(e)(1) concludes by formally providing examples illustrating
the rule, which - as indicated by its title - states that: "[E]xamples of de
minimis fringe benefits are... coffee, doughnuts and soft drinks," among
others (hereafter, the coffee example).1 3 At first, this illustrative example
seems straightforward, as we are all too familiar with the ubiquitous
workplace kitchenette. However, one could think about alternative snacks,
and begin to question the intelligibility of the rule, unless, of course, one is
completely satisfied with that most traditional grub. For instance, what
8 The extensive use of regulatory examples also happens to be unique among peer
countries to the United States. An informal survey of experienced tax experts from
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries
revealed that no other jurisdiction uses regulatory examples (or their equivalents)
extensively. Few countries' regulations include a small number of examples in the format of
open or closed lists of items to which the norm refers, yet in most countries examples are
used almost exclusively in rulings and similar government proclamations of a lesser legal
status than that of regulations. Note that the United States's practice was previously similar
to that of the rest of the world. See Cummings, supra note 7.
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1992).
10 See I.R.C. § 132(a)(4) (exempting de minimis fringe benefits from gross income).
'1 See I.R.C. § 132(e)(1).
12 The regulation also provides rules applicable to particular types of benefits, such as
transit passes. Id.
13 Id. Other fringe benefits include: occasional typing of personal letters by a company
secretary; occasional personal use of an employer's copying machine, provided that the
employer exercises sufficient control and imposes significant restrictions on the personal use
of the machine so that at least 85 percent of the use of the machine is for business purposes;
occasional cocktail parties, group meals, or picnics for employees and their guests, etc. Id.
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about tea, hot chocolate, and muffins? They must also qualify, for they are
indistinguishable from the mentioned snacks. Yet, even this basic analogy
requires interpretation that in practice is not required when coffee,
doughnuts, and soft drinks are provided. Herbal infusions, health bars and
fresh fruit smoothies make the analogy even less obvious. This is perhaps
due to the different message these snacks project - a message of health
centered nutrition rather than "free food" happiness. It may also be due to
the implicit assumption that these snacks target a different, more exclusive
type of employee. There is also the implicit assumption that this type of
snack is costlier. The cost is not only a distinguishing factor but also a
relevant factor under the regulations - taking the healthy snack outside the
scope of de minimis. Yet, in this case one must ask whether espresso
coffee, gluten free, oil free doughnuts, and canned energy drinks are
distinguishable from the healthy snacks mentioned above, and, more
importantly, would they be treated differently by taxpayers under the
regulations. This illustrates how the examples present a challenging
interpretation of the law - often providing little understanding and even
less transparency.
Thus, not unlike Breton's vision of good art, tax advice often relies on
seemingly more down-to-earth examples, sometimes with little attention to
the rules themselves. These are clearly problematic circumstances, yet tax
scholarship has completely ignored the use of regulatory examples and the
potential conflict between the regulatory language and the examples that
accompany it.14 Moreover, examples are written into regulations (and
increasingly so) with no learned basis, explicit policy, or guidance beyond
the mere encouragement of their use.15 This article initiates a long-overdue
analysis of the use of regulatory examples, and challenges the policy of
adding examples to regulations, and "the more the better."l 6 This challenge
will likely be viewed as controversial and at first even summarily
dismissed, including by some tax practitioners, who would find it difficult
to imagine their practice without these examples. Even for the less well-
14 This article generally refers to examples in tax regulations as "regulatory examples,"
and to the nonexample language of the regulations as "regulatory language." The only other
article focusing on regulatory examples focuses on the proper interpretation of these
examples. See Susan Morse & Leigh Osofsky, Regulating by Examples, 35 YALE J. REG.
(forthcoming 2018).
15 The Service has issued no guidance regarding regulatory examples, yet private
discussions with government officials confirmed a general support for their use, and an
understanding that such use does not require further thought or guidance, i.e., it is left for the
discretion of the regulation authors.
16 This is a quote of a high-level government official who was interviewed in an
informal setting about the current attitude within the Service regarding the addition of
examples to regulations.
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informed reader, an assault on examples may be suspect, as she reflexively
understands that examples are fundamental to good speech and writing, as
well as to effective thinking and understanding. 17 We humans benefit from
examples when we learn new things.18 Examples and counter-examples are
also fundamental to lawyering and legal education. 19 How could one
challenge their intuitive usefulness, especially when they are written to help
taxpayers understand the notoriously incomprehensible tax laws?(!) The
argument of this article is not that examples are bad per se, but rather that
their current use is faulty, arbitrary, and uninformed, lacking even basic
administrative guidance as to the why, where, and how to use such
examples. 2 0 It further argues that we can do better and proposes a few
simple first steps in that direction, based on insights from behavioral
17 See Edwina Rissland, Example-Based Reasoning, in INFORMAL REASONING AND
EDUCATION 187, 187-207 (James F. Voss et al. eds., 1991) (focusing on the importance of
examples for learning in mathematics, computer science, and law). Research of example-
based learning is extensive in both education and psychology scholarship, and the utility of
examples is intuitively understood by all. Yet, it is interesting to note how powerful
examples are in comparison to other means of learning, such as direct instructions. See, e.g.,
Jo-Anne LeFevre & Peter Dixon, Do Written Instructions Need Examples? 3 COGNITION &
INSTRUCTION 1 (1986) (demonstrating experimentally the power of examples over direct
instructions in learning and problem-solving situations).
18 See, e.g., Michelene T. H. Chi, Miriam Basok, Matthew W. Lewis, Peter Reimann &
Robert Glaser, Self-Explanations: How Students Study and Use Examples in Learning to
Solve Problems, 13 COGNITIVE SCI. 145 (1989) (exploring the process of learning from
examples to self-explain concepts and to develop understanding, example-independent
knowledge of the concept); Jakke Tamminen, Matthew H. Davis & Kathleen Rastle, From
Specific Examples to General Knowledge in Language Learning, 79 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1
(2015) (uncovering some key cognitive mechanisms that characterize the process of learning
from examples in the domain of language learning).
19 See, e.g., Rissland, supra note 17.
20 Even the single instance where the government explicitly provides support for the
use of examples, such support is general and self-supporting rather than real guidance. See
PLAIN LANGUAGE ACTION AND INFO. NETWORK, FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES 70
(rev. ed. 2011), http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines
/FederalPLGuidelines.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES] ("Examples
help you clarify complex concepts, even in regulations. They are an ideal way to help your
readers. In spoken English, when you ask for clarification of something, people often
respond by giving you an example. Good examples can substitute for long explanations. The
more complex the concept you are writing about, the more you should consider using an
example. By giving your audience an example that's relevant to their situation, you help
them relate to your document."). As further explained in this article, this statement may be
true, yet it does not provide any guidance as to how to achieve the goals of clarity and
certainty articulated. Note that the actual orders, including the President's Executive Order
that accompanied the Plain Writing Act of 2010, do not include any reference to the use of
regulatory examples. See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 102-03 (2017).
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science.2 1
The first original contribution of this article is the exposition of the
deficiencies in the current use of examples in tax regulations. A dedicated
survey of tax professionals conducted for this article demonstrates
practitioner uncertainty regarding regulatory examples and also highlights
other deficiencies of the current practice. 22 The survey also strongly
supports a call for reform, towards which this article makes the first steps.
The second original contribution of this article is an analysis of the appeal
of regulatory examples and its potential downside, based on insights from
behavioral science, particularly from the study of cognitive biases. The
article finally proposes, as its third original contribution, a more learned
approach to the writing of regulatory examples that would rely on these
behavioral insights to improve the effectiveness and perceived fairness of
tax regulation in the United States.
Part I discusses the current, ubiquitous use of regulatory examples in
the practice of tax law in the United States, and the deficiencies of this use.
Part II follows with the related question about the appropriate clientele
catered to by regulatory examples, explaining that writing for experts or for
the less informed may have significant consequences that are not taken into
account when examples are written, and proposing a standard for writing
more effective examples. Part III analyzes the "why" question, mapping the
policy challenges presented by the confusion over the purpose of regulatory
examples. Part IV explores where the use of regulatory examples may be
appropriate. Part V provides a few modest reform proposals based on that
analysis, and Part VI concludes.
21 See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Psychology and Institutional Design, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 801,
802 (2008) (discussing the general benefits for the law if its design would be based on
knowledge acquired by research in Psychology). See also BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (arguing for, and applying insights from,
psychology research to tax).
22 The survey included more than 300 participants, all experienced tax practitioners,
anonymously answering questions about the use of examples in their practice, as explained
throughout this article. About half of the participants responded online and the other half
completed an identical paper questionnaire. The online responses were practically identical
to the paper responses. Participants resided in all areas of the country, although there was
likely a larger representation of participants from Florida, being the author's home state, and
New York City, where much of the country's sophisticated tax practice concentrates.
Participants had various specific expertise within tax law with a strong representation from
mainstream corporate tax practitioners. The purpose of the survey was to confirm the
experience of the author with the use of examples in tax practice - which it did - not to
draw any statistical conclusions.
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II. EXAMPLES IN PRACTICE
A. The Survey
To establish the important role of regulatory examples in the practice
of tax law in the United States, and to expose their deficiencies, this article
considers a survey conducted among experienced tax law practitioners. 23
More than 65 percent of participants said the use of examples in the practice
of tax law is either frequent or very frequent, and an additional 20 percent
said they regularly use examples in their practice. 24 Regulator examples are
proverbial "life-savers" for practitioners of tax law, providing factual
narratives with which a taxpayer could compare her own relevant facts, and
effectively constructing norms that could be applied to those facts with
reasonable simplicity.
None of the participants dismissed the practical importance of
regulatory examples. Yet, despite the lack of controversy regarding the
usefulness of the examples, the participants - all sophisticated
practitioners - were divided when asked about the primary purpose of
regulatory examples. Approximately 40 percent of participants said the
examples simply illustrate the relevant rules they accompany; 13 percent
said they primarily add explanations to the rules; 5 percent said the
regulatory examples primarily aim at expanding norms beyond the simple
language of the regulations; and another 5 percent said their primary
purpose is to prevent or permit particular taxpayer actions (or
transactions).25 More than one-third of the participants said one cannot say
that regulatory examples serve a single primary purpose, but rather that they
do all or some of the above, interchangeably. 2 6 Finally, a small number of
participants argued the examples are written merely as a matter of tradition,
with no particular purpose in mind.2 7
These results demonstrate the confusion as to the intended role of
regulatory examples and the lack of a measuring stick to evaluate their
necessity and efficacy. Such disarray is consistent with the absence of
official guidance on the matter, and with the want of clarity over the
relationship between the examples and the regulatory language. This article
argues in response that clarity of purpose is essential for proper use and
23 See supra note 22.
24 See supra note 22.
25 See supra note 22.
26 See supra note 22.
27 See supra note 22. Note, however, that this unfavorable view of regulation writing
was not given as one of the options available to survey participants, but rather provided
independently and spontaneously by participants under the "other" option in response to the
question about the primary purpose of regulatory examples.
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interpretation of rules. It also argues that some uses of examples may be
inappropriate or counterproductive and therefore should be controlled - a
difficult task considering their current unguided use. Finally, the article
demonstrates that a clear purpose may be useful even when transparency is
not intended, such as a regulatory "nudge" in a desirable direction.28
The survey participants were even less complimentary about current
regulation writing when they came to assess the impact of regulatory
examples. Almost half of the participants (47 percent) said the examples
often describe simplistic or unrealistic circumstances and therefore add little
or nothing to the regulations. 29 Forty-three percent of participants said the
examples often rehash the language of regulations without adding clarity. 30
Twenty percent of participants found the examples often introduce conflicts
with the regulatory language itself or with other examples.3 1 These answers
provide an unflattering picture that conflicts with the intuitive satisfaction
the regulatory examples provide.
A more specific policy concern that arose from the survey is that
regulatory examples often target certain taxpayer's actions or transactions,
regardless of the generality of the regulatory language - a practice
negatively mentioned by 68 percent of participants. 32 Note that such
"targeting" perception is not negligible, with about 5 percent of participants
even viewing it as the primary purpose of the use of regulatory examples,
mentioned above.33 Nonetheless, the survey showed a contradiction in this
context - despite the widespread concern over this practice, less than 20
percent of participants believed such use (narrow examples targeting
specific actions or transactions) should be discontinued.34 This
inconsistency only highlights the legal confusion over regulatory examples
and the desirability for more informed regulation writing. One may view
the targeting of specific, presumably bad, transactions as normatively
justifiable, regardless of the device used, since such practice permits the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) to use examples to shut down gaps in
general norms. Yet, this view does not consider alternative, 35 superior
means towards the same end, such as those suggested by this article.
Finally, the survey asked participants about possible reform, and they
28 The term "nudge" was coined in RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
29 See supra note 22.
30 See supra note 22.
31 See supra note 22.
32 See supra note 22.
33 See supra note 22.
34 See supra note 22.
3 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 7.
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voiced a loud and clear message about the need to rethink the current
practice of regulatory examples use. Less than 10 percent of participants
found the frequency of use of regulatory examples and their drafting
appropriate. 36 The majority of participants (about 65 percent) supported the
provision of guidance and increased uniformity in the drafting of regulatory
examples. 37 A similar majority supported, more specifically, the elimination
of general examples as well as those describing "easy" cases or unlikely
circumstances. 38 More than one-third of participants also supported
clarification of the status of examples vis-A-vis the rest of the regulatory
language (specifically arguing for an inferior status for the examples, i.e.,
that they be subject to the regulatory language). 39 This article analytically
supports all of these ideas for reform.40 It proceeds next to expose the
current use of regulatory tax examples, examining first the basic question of
their legal status vis-A-vis the regulatory language.
B. The Legal Status ofExamples in Treasury Regulations
Regulatory examples cohabit with the rest of the regulatory language
with no explicit norm to organize their relationships and legal status. In an
effort to resolve this uncertainty, one may argue the examples are simply
part of the regulatory language and should therefore carry exactly the same
weight as the rest of it. According to this formal approach, an example may
serve any purpose or function (so long as it is not ultra vires). It may, for
instance, extend the scope of the relevant norm beyond the regulatory
language, setting the boundaries of the norm regardless of the regulatory
language. This approach also requires that when an example restricts the
scope of the norm provided by the regulatory language, it should not be
viewed as setting the norm's outer boundaries.
A particular regulatory example, concerning the so-called continuity-
of-interest requirement of tax free reorganizations, demonstrates this
approach to interpretation (hereafter the continuity-of-interest example). 41
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) grants a tax benefit to certain merger
and acquisition transactions, termed reorganizations, pursuant to which
actions that would otherwise require current taxation are ignored, deferring
taxation to a later date.42 This is the case, for example, for shareholders of a
36 See supra note 22.
37 See supra note 22.
38 See supra note 22.
39 See supra note 22.
40 See infra Part ViI.
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (2011).
42 I.R.C. §§ 354, 361, 368. If the merger qualifies as a tax reorganization, our tax law
effectively ignores this taxable event and defers it until the taxpayer otherwise disposes of
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corporation T (for Target) that merges into a corporation S (for Surviving),
who exchange their T shares for shares in S post-merger. This would
typically trigger taxation for these shareholders in the same way they would
be taxed if they simply sold (with gain) the T shares on the market. 43 The
deferral of tax is granted pursuant to the belief that it facilitates market
efficiency and ignores events that are essentially just changes in form.44
Consistent with this "purely paper transactions" view, the regulations
require substantial continuity of shareholder interest in the transaction,
namely that enough of the old T shareholders must "continue" with their
investment even if now it is in the format of another legal entity: S, the
surviving corporation. 45 The obvious question becomes how much
continuity is sufficient for this purpose. The regulations require the
application of an all facts and circumstances test to satisfy the continuity
requirement.4 6 This test is naturally difficult to apply, and the solution is a
regulatory example that provides that 40 percent continuity4 7 suffices to
qualify a merger as a "tax free" reorganization. 48 In practice, this
percentage has become the golden standard, leaving the regulatory norm
(the all fact and circumstances test) largely empty of content.49 Applying
the approach that views regulatory examples as simply part of the
regulatory language, one should then conclude that if the facts and
circumstances test could tolerate less continuity, say 25 percent,50 it, and
not the 40 percent example, would mark the outer boundaries of the
the (new) shares.
43 I.R.C. § 1001.
44 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, A Good Old Habit, or Just an Old One? Preferential Tax
Treatment for Reorganizations, I BYU L. REV. 1, 52-68 (2004) (reviewing the history and
evolution of the reorganization rules in an appendix to the article that calls for a repeal of the
reorganization rules, and demonstrates that they cannot be supported on fairness, efficiency
or administrability grounds).
45 Id. at 54.
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i) (2011).
47 Measured by comparing the value of the target pre-merger in comparison to the
value of surviving's shares held by old target shareholders post-merger. Id. § 1.368-l (e)(2).
48 Id. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1. The example was clearly drafted after a hallmark case
found less than 39% continuity to be sufficient. See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296
U.S. 374 (1934). Prior to the drafting of the regulations, this case had generally been
considered the standard authority on the matter. Note that 40% has become the standard
despite the fact that another case accepted only 25% continuity, and that the Service
expressed its willingness to write a letter ruling only when 50% continuity is present. See
Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415 (1936); Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568. Prior to the
inclusion of this example, the "safe" path for taxpayers passed through the 50% ruling
threshold, so, in that sense, the example made new law.
49 See also BORIS 1. BlTTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 12.21 (2017), Westlaw.
5o See supra note 48.
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continuity norm.
This is not, however, the common interpretation of the continuity-of-
interest regulations. The 40 percent continuity-of-interest example sets the
pragmatic boundary of the norm, supporting in this case an interpretation
that distinguishes examples from the regulatory language, and possibly
treating their content as lex specialis to the regulatory language they
accompany.5 1 This approach fits the common practice regarding the
continuity-of-interest example that draws the legal line to specify an
otherwise inherently vague rule. The coffee example 52 may also be
interpreted in this manner, yet obviously that would be overly formalistic,
as cheap tea, cookies, and water should also qualify for de minimis fringe
benefit purposes. Consequently, one must consider another approach to the
interpretation of regulatory examples that would view the examples as mere
illustrations of the regulatory language 53 - illustrations that clarify the
content of the norm yet do not set its outer boundaries. In conclusion,
different regulatory examples warrant different approaches of interpretation,
leaving the status of regulatory examples generally obscure and sometimes
difficult to determine.
C. Examples in the Practice of Tax Law
The importance of regulatory examples in the practice of law becomes
self-evident in light of the above described response to our survey. The
continuity-of-interest example 54 provides a good illustration of the utility of
regulatory examples. When "tax-free" treatment is sought in a merger
transaction, the assertion that 40 percent continuity is sufficient is clearly
superior to the application of the vague facts and circumstances test
prescribed by the regulatory language.55  This example represents
51 The full Latin phrase Lex specialis derogat legi generali means: Special law repeals
general laws. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWTiZ, Lex specialis derogat legi
generali, in GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
52 See supra Part 1.
53 One may argue that the language preceding certain examples supports this
interpretation. Take for instance: "the following examples illustrate this paragraph (d),"
found in the context of the continuity of business enterprise (COBE) requirement. Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (2011). This requirement is corollary to the continuity-of-interest
requirement, and equally necessary for reorganization treatment, both discussed earlier in
this Part. Yet, other examples simply follow the heading: "examples." See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.382-8(g) (2007). One cannot reasonably detect consistency or any meaningful intention
here. The inclusion or exclusion of such language seems simply too arbitrary to rely on in
this context.
54 See supra Part II.B.
55 Taxpayers may acquire even more certainty with 50% continuity, since the Service
is willing to provide favorable private letter rulings in these cases. See Rev. Proc. 77-37,
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prototypical line-drawing that is naturally very helpful for taxpayers with
the right set of facts, say, 42 percent continuity, yet, they put an extra
burden on a taxpayer with, say, only 35 percent continuity. The latter
taxpayer may argue that her case is indistinguishable from the former case.
This presents a difficulty that is inherent in all line-drawing situations -
and may be viewed as simply necessary, especially when the rules are
transparent and the taxpayer is given the opportunity to arrange her affairs
accordingly. The question remains, however, whether a regulatory example
is the appropriate device in each case, especially when the writing of
examples is unregulated and likely subject to fewer controls in comparison
to the regulatory language, and when the interpretation of regulatory
examples is inconsistent and incoherent.
Another common type of regulatory examples is the primarily
illustrative example. These examples appear to simply illustrate the
regulatory or statutory language. The coffee example mentioned above 56 is
one seemingly straightforward illustrative example. Yet, even it requires
interpretation. Simple questions arise: to what extent is the list of snacks
mentioned subject to the rest of the regulatory language? Should
unmentioned snacks be subject to the same test as mentioned snacks? What
are the boundaries between high and low value snacks, such as between
made-to-order espresso drinks and a communal coffee pot? This article
returns to these questions in the next section.
Another type of illustrative example focuses on methodology rather
than the mention of qualified items. To illustrate, take Treasury Regulation
section 1.482-4(c)(4), Example 1 (2011):
(i) USpharm, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, develops a new
drug Z that is a safe and effective treatment for the disease zeezee.
USpharm has obtained patents covering drug Z in the United
States and in various foreign countries. USpharm has also obtained
the regulatory authorizations necessary to market drug Z in the
United States and in foreign countries.
(ii) USpharm licenses its subsidiary in country X, Xpharm, to
produce and sell drug Z in country X. At the same time, it licenses
an unrelated company, Ydrug, to produce and sell drug Z in
country Y, a neighboring country. Prior to licensing the drug,
USpharm had obtained patent protection and regulatory approvals
1977-2 C.B. 568. Yet, such certainty comes at a price that one does not need to pay if she
relied solely on the language of the example: a ruling would require full disclosure and
costly interaction with the government, leading most taxpayers in reality to rely on the
example.
56 See supra Part II.
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in both countries and both countries provide similar protection for
intellectual property rights. Country X and country Y are similar
countries in terms of population, per capita income and the
incidence of disease zeezee. Consequently, drug Z is expected to
sell in similar quantities and at similar prices in both countries. In
addition, costs of producing and marketing drug Z in each country
are expected to be approximately the same.
(iii) USpharm and Xpharm establish terms for the license of drug
Z that are identical in every material respect, including royalty
rate, to the terms established between USpharm and Ydrug. In this
case the district director determines that the royalty rate
established in the Ydrug license agreement is a reliable measure of
the arm's length royalty rate for the Xpharm license agreement.
This example illustrates what is likely the "king's road" in application
of the transfer pricing rules. The transfer pricing rules 57 regulate
multinational enterprises (MNEs) by making sure that their cross-border
transactions "clearly reflect income," which is the U. S. term for nonabusive
transactions.5 8 Their goal is to prevent abuse of the income tax rules by
such corporate groups through their ubiquitous nonmarket, intra-group
transactions. 59 These MNEs can otherwise easily use arbitrage techniques
based on different tax rates and tax base rules to minimize their overall
effective tax rates, typically at the expense of high-tax jurisdictions such as
the United States. 60 Transfer pricing rules universally use arm's length
17 See I.R.C. § 482.
5 See Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and Clear Reflection of
Income: What Constrains Discretion, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 445, 492 (1999)
(examining the constraints on the Service's discretion in the application of this rule). The
immediate statutory source provides that the Service can intervene if a taxpayer's method of
accounting does not clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(b).
59 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAx Rav. 89 (1995) (tracking the history
and evolution of transfer pricing as an anti-abuse rule directed at MNEs).
6 Even with the transfer pricing rules, MNEs fully exploit these planning
opportunities, as evidenced by the launch of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
project. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION DEv., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (2013), http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-
9789264192744-en.htm; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf. For
one example of these planning techniques see Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in
No-Tax Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG TECH., (Dec. 10, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-1 0/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-tax-
bermuda-soar-to-I 0-billion.html.
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methodology to prevent such abuse. 61 The arm's length methodology uses
(market) prices used by market transactions (of unrelated parties) that are
comparable to the potentially abusive transaction as a benchmark for proper
pricing of intra-firm, cross-border transactions. 62 Transfer pricing is most
critically important for transactions involving intangibles since cross-border
trade in intangibles is the justification for firms operating in the MNE
format, which is the sole concern of the transfer pricing rules. 63
Example 164 illustrates the use of the comparable uncontrolled
transaction (CUT) method, 65 which is the primary and the most
straightforward application of the arm's length standard to transactions
involving intangibles. The example illustrates this method well: a single
product (drug Z) is transacted across borders based on essentially the same
contracts with two different distributors, one an unrelated party (YDrug) in
a market transaction, and one a related party (the Xpharm subsidiary) in the
transaction under the scrutiny of the transfer pricing rules. 66 The solution is
quite straightforward and appealing at first glance: mandate the taxpayer to
declare income from the challenged transaction with its Xpharm subsidiary
using the market price used in the comparable market transaction with the
unrelated YDrug company. 67
Finding comparable transactions is the key to success for this
methodology, and indeed this difficult exercise has become a major
practical challenge for taxpayers. 68 Yet, for purposes of this article, let us
focus on the level of comparability required by the example: the same
product, distributed by the same producer, under the same contractual
terms, to neighboring countries, with similar protection for intellectual
property rights, with roughly the same size of population, similar per capita
income, and a similar incidence of the disease zeezee. This is manifestly a
very tall order. I often challenge my students, promising grade points as an
61 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 59.
62 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of
Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REv. 79, 96 (2008).
61 Id. at 86-87.
64 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(4), ex. 1. (2011).
65 Id. § 1.482-4(c).
66 Id. § 1.482-4(c)(4), ex. 1.
67 The use of such internal comparables is condoned and even promoted in practice by
governments. See, e.g., Lorraine Eden, The Arm's Length Standard, in GLOBAL TAX
FAIRNESS, 153, 155 (Thomas Pogge & Krishen Mehta eds., 2016).
68 See, e.g., Kerrie Sadiq, The Fundamental Failing of the Traditional Transfer Pricing
Regime - Applying the Arm's Length Standard to Multinational Banks Based on a
Comparability Analysis, 58 BULL. INT'L TAX'N 2 (2004) (focusing on the banking industry);
Brauner, supra note 62 (focusing on the inherent difficulties of finding comparables in
transactions involving intangibles).
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incentive, to come up with examples for such two countries. Regardless of
the (significant) degree of flexibility permitted, only one plausible example
arose over the years: The Netherlands and Belgium. Indeed, these are
neighboring countries, somewhat similar in population size (about 17
million v. 11+ million), gross domestic product per capita ($51,000 v.
$45,00), perhaps similar propensities to get sick by one disease or another,
somewhat similar economies, cultures, and values. 69 It is not difficult to
observe that one could make good arguments as to why these countries
should not be viewed as similar enough to qualify under the example, yet a
better example has not arisen.
Admittedly, transfer pricmig requires making many pragmatic
adjustments, including for dissimilarities among countries, yet it is obvious
that the composition and number of the dissimilarities will make the
comparison useless at a certain point if the benchmark is as demanding as
that presented by the regulatory example.
The example is followed by a variation, in Treasury Regulation section
1.482-4(c)(4), Example 2 (2011):
The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that the incidence
of the disease zeezee in Country Y is much higher than in Country
X. In this case, the profit potential from exploitation of the right to
make and sell drug Z is likely to be much higher in country Y than
it is in Country X. Consequently, the Ydrug license agreement is
unlikely to provide a reliable measure of the arm's length royalty
rate for the Xpharm license.
The inclusion of Example 2 demonstrates, first, that the author of the
regulation was aware of the limited scope for adjustments when
comparability is insufficient; second, that the focus of the author of the
regulation was on the product similarity - the drug and the disease it was
designed to fight in the context of market definition (since arm's length is a
market based methodology); and, third, that the author of the regulation did
not find it necessary to address other country comparability factors and their
impact on the possibility of the use of the CUT method. What if countries
are not neighboring yet otherwise comparable? What if they are otherwise
quite similar but one is much larger than the other? What if they are part of
an economic arrangement such as the European Union that in effect creates
a single market for many purposes? These issues are open for debate with
respect to comparability, and the example does not provide guidance. The
example adds only confusion to the regulatory language. The parties to a
69 See, e.g., The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
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transfer pricing dispute (taxpayers and the government) may both find
support for their arguments in the example, yet it does not promote the
resolution of the dispute, and it is clearly not helpful for the development of
the law.
What can one learn from these transfer pricing examples? Example 170
is obviously unrealistic. Example 271 is negative in nature, adding little to
an already unrealistic primary Example 1. One could argue that Example 2
demonstrates that market conditions (such as the propensity to catch the
disease) matter more than other properties of the market population (such as
its size). Yet that is senseless, because all of these properties equally affect
potential profits, which are the apparent focus of the regulation as a whole.
Furthermore, the example is obfuscating, since emphasis on certain
comparability factors rather than others may be more easily and directly
clarified by the regulatory language (as indeed it largely is in this case)72
and should not be left to implicit suggestion in examples that may be
interpreted differently by different readers. Moreover, one could have
clarified the primary importance of market conditions over other properties
directly, in the regulatory language, with much less confusion. In
conclusion, these examples add nothing to the norm prescribed by the
regulation and instead likely add confusion and distraction that can be used
to frustrate rather than advance the norm setting exercise.
A third type of illustrative examples merely demonstrates the
mechanics of a prescribed methodology, such as plugging numbers into
provided formulae. For instance, Treasury Regulation section 1.1060-1(d)
(2008) illustrates the ordering rule included in Code section 1060 for
allocating an acquisition price (a lump sum) among various assets in certain
asset acquisitions (hereafter the section 1060 example). The issue is that the
negotiated price often is paid for the "business" as a whole, naturally taking
into account the values of the particular assets, yet, more importantly
focusing on the future profit potential of the acquired enterprise. For tax
purposes, however, the acquisition, being an assets acquisition, is viewed as
a combined facilitation of acquisitions of each of the assets separately, since
each of the assets must be assigned a cost basis, based on which future
transactions involving such assets will be calculated and assessed for tax
purposes. The allocation of the price over assets may be very meaningful
for tax purposes as different types of assets are taxed differently, and
therefore taxpayers may wish to optimize their tax positions at the expense
70 Id. § 1.482-4(c)(4), ex. 1.
71 Id. § 1.482-4(c)(4), ex. 2.
72 The transfer pricing regulations elaborate at length on comparability factors and how
to determine their hierarchic importance. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1(d) (2009), 1.482-
3(b)(2) (1995), 1.482-3(c)(3) (1995), 1.482-3(d)(3) (1995), 1.482-4(c)(2) (2011).
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of the Treasury. Thus, the regulatory language provides a nonrandom
ordering rule, and the purpose of the example is to demonstrate the
mathematical process of assigning values according to the ordering rule,
and little beyond that. This type of example is important for understanding
the exact rule prescribed and how exactly the formula works. 73
In conclusion, examples are important for effective tax regulations. The
regulatory language often lacks the specificity required for the application
of tax law that must eventually be reduced to precise dollar numbers.
Similarly, illustrations of general regulatory language may help it be more
approachable and understood more quickly, precisely, and economically.
Nevertheless, the noted examples also demonstrate the problems that
regulatory examples introduce.
D. Examples in Court
The lack of guidance on the use of regulatory examples - their legal
status and appropriate interpretation - has not been remedied by the
courts. This is more surprising than the lack of interest among the other
players in the tax world. Courts generally do not have the luxury of
choosing among the legal issues presented to them in cases they must
decide. Therefore, one would expect the courts to regularly consider
regulatory examples as they are frequently used in tax planning. Moreover,
one would expect taxpayers (and the government) to broaden their use of
arguments based on regulatory examples in court. Yet, this has not been the
case. Courts have generally devoted little attention to examples in their
decisions. They rarely pay attention to the legal status of examples and the
other fundamental aspects raised by this article. Now, the courts are not
responsible for answering why, where, and how examples should be used in
the regulations, yet they are responsible for interpreting the regulations -
leaving their infrequent discussion of these examples puzzling.74
This article presumes that the courts' lack of interest in examples
simply follows that of the rest of the tax community. That is, judges accept
the conventional wisdom about the desirability of the use of regulatory
examples. 75 Indeed, as already mentioned, no decision has extensively
n See Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(d) (2008).
74 In addition, the courts' neglect of explicit analysis of regulatory examples
contributes to the lack of accountability by the government in the regulation of regulatory
examples, as discussed throughout this article. For the importance of accountability in
rulemaking, see, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial
Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 514-515 (2002).
7 The survey conducted for the purposes of this article was not extended to the courts,
judges, and their views about regulatory examples. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text. Therefore, this article uses the working presumption that judges simply operate in the
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analyzed the role and legal status of regulatory examples. 76 Only a few
decisions even identify the issue - yet these decisions do not develop a
singular approach to dealing with it. Some cases interpret the examples as
being part of the regulatory scheme, not different from the other regulatory
language. 77 Other cases viewed the examples as mere illustrations of the
regulatory language, and therefore subject to the norms the regulatory
language sets. 78 Still other decisions applied the examples to the facts of the
cases, usually echoing arguments made by parties to the litigation. 79
Without explicit legal analysis, these decisions implicitly take one of the
above-mentioned approaches. Finally, some decisions simply ignored
regulatory examples despite their direct relevance to the facts of the cases in
front of them.8 0 In a nutshell, the courts share with the tax bar the same
confusion over, and inconsistency in, the treatment of regulatory examples.
1. Parks v. Commissioner8 1
A recent case, Parks, provides a good illustration of the difficulties that
courts have with regulatory examples and their struggle to avoid a
comprehensive analysis of their role.82 In Parks, the Tax Court analyzed a
series of radio messages funded by Mr. Parks's private foundation 83 to
determine whether such funding constituted taxable expenditures under
same way other tax professionals operate in this regard. A separate study of this matter can
be made, butfor now it is beyond the scope of this article. This working presumption is
sufficient for its purposes, since the primary goal of this article is not to criticize the courts'
interpretation of regulatory examples but rather to provide a better understanding of their
current and potential role in the regulations.
76 Even in Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589 (2000), perhaps the classical case
where a court found a regulatory example invalid, it did so based on its contradiction to valid
interpretation of the statute with no analysis of the role and status of regulatory examples
generally. In the case, Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(e), ex. 5 (2005) was found in conflict with
I.R.C. § 2702.
n See, e.g., Parks, infra note 8 1.
78 See, e.g., Tenn. Baptist Children's Homes Inc. v. United States, 790 F.2d 534, 539
(6th Cir. 1986); Katkin v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1978); Nico v.
Commissioner, 565 F.2d 1234, 1238 (2d Cir. 1977); Solomon v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
379, 386 (1976); 1210 Colvin Ave., Inc. v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9474
(W.D.N.Y. 1981).
7 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 719 (1995) (generally adopting
language in an example that mostly deviates from the regulatory language).
8o See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44
(2011) (interpreting the FICA students exemption).
" 145 T.C. 278 (2015).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 281 (finding that, pursuant to I.R.C. § 509(a), the private foundation was
exempt from income tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
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Code section 4945.84 Generally, a private foundation is liable for excise
taxes on expenditures for anything other than a list of specified activities,
including: activities with religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes.8 5 Regardless, a private foundation may be subject to
excise taxes if it expends any amount attempting to influence legislation.86
The radio messages at stake contained information and commentary
relevant to pending Oregon state ballot measures at the time of their
production and broadcast.8 7 The Service audited the foundation's tax
returns and concluded that the expenditures on the messages were taxable
expenditures and thus subject to excise taxes.88 Mr. Parks argued the
messages were not lobbying communications subject to excise tax because
they did not directly refer to any ballot initiatives. 89 The court disagreed and
upheld the excise taxes charged. 90 In doing so, the court concluded that
because the radio messages used language that closely mirrored the
explanatory statements on the initiatives mailed to the public by the Oregon
Secretary of State, the messages did in fact directly refer to the ballot
initiatives.91 Additionally, the court found that the radio messages (except
one, which provided facts and statistics to support the statements made)
failed to qualify as educational nonpartisan analysis, study, or research
under the regulations. 92
For the purposes of this article, the interesting part of the decision is the
analysis of the relationship between the radio messages and the ballot
initiatives, or whether the messages "referred to" the initiatives as required
by the regulatory language in order to charge it with the excise taxes. 93
There appears to be little doubt that direct reference such as naming an
84 Id. at 298.
8 I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B); 4945(d)(5).
86 The Court also examined whether the manager of the foundation, Loren E. Parks,
was liable for excise taxes related to such expenditures imposed by I.R.C. § 4945(a)(2) and
4945(b)(2). Parks, 145 T.C. at 326-33.
87 Id. at 281.
88 The Service also charged Mr. Parks with additional excise taxes pursuant to I.R.C. §
4945(a)(2) and 4945(b)(2) for authorizing the expenditures and for failing to take corrective
action. Id.
8 Id. at 335.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 307.
92 The Court also upheld most of the excise taxes charged to Mr. Parks, noting that
although Mr. Parks had received written advice from the foundation's tax attorney on the
taxability of some of the expenditures, the advice did nothing more than recite facts and
express a conclusion. As such, most of the attorney's advice was not reasoned and could not
be relied upon. Id. at 329-33.
93 The complete analysis of the path taken by the Court to reach this point is beyond
the scope of this article.
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initiative (e.g., "Measure 61" in our case94 ) is forbidden based on the
transparent objective of the relevant law to prevent tax-favored private
foundations from engaging in lobbying. Yet, the regulatory language does
not explain the term "refer to," leaving unclear the boundaries between
forbidden indirect reference to an initiative and a permitted statement -
presumably one that incidentally engages in similar matters as a legislative
initiative, for educational purposes, for instance. The Tax Court did not
engage in the general interpretation of the term "refer to" in the regulations
nor did the court refer to the purpose of the regulations but rather, it
immediately and directly resorted to the examples provided by the
regulation. The examples mention messages using language "widely used"
or "identified with" specific legislation (such as "excisable") and in doing
so, effectively expand the prohibition against lobbying by private
foundations. The court ruled:
On the basis of the principles illustrated in the regulatory
examples, we hold that a communication 'refers to' a ballot
measure within the meaning of the regulations if it either refers to
the measure by name or, without naming it, employs terms widely
used in connection with the measure or describes the content or
effect of the measure. 95
Yet, the court does not explicitly explain its sweeping decision on the
matter. It simply adopts the language of the examples as if it were part of
the regulatory language itself. 96
The Tax Court clearly views the examples as equal in status to the rest
of the regulations when it makes its ruling based on the meaning of the
relevant term ("refers to") provided in the examples yet not in the
regulatory language. 9 7 The decision reads as if the court feels bound by the
examples, as if they prevent it from engaging in independent interpretation
of the regulatory language (the term "refer to" in this case). However, at the-
same time, the Court also distinguishes between the language of the
regulation itself and that of the examples. It states that the examples serve
an illustrative role, in the service of the core norm provided by the
regulation.9 8 The Parks court thus falls hostage to the confusion over the
role of examples in tax regulations even though it exclusively bases its
decision on the language of such examples.
94 Parks, 145 T.C. at 305.
1 Id. at 309.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 308-10.
98 Id. at 308-09.
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2. Schott v. Commissioner"
An earlier case dealt with an example that limited the scope of a rule
included in regulatory language itself, which limited a statutory rule. In
Schott, a married couple had each contributed money to an irrevocable trust
(eventually for the benefit of their descendants), known as a Grantor
Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT). 00 The terms of the trusts were similar:
the trust would pay an annuity (percentage of the trust's corpus) for a period
of the shorter of fifteen years or life of the grantor. 0 1 Further, if the grantor
died prior to the end of the fifteen-year term, the annuity was to be paid to
the spouse for the balance of the term, unless the grantor had previously
revoked the right. 102 The Code requires grantors in these circumstances to
pay gift tax on the amount granted reduced by the interest retained (what
they expect to get back from the trust) in the grant. 103 Since this creates an
incentive to inflate the value of the retained interest (in order to save on gift
taxes), Code section 2702 limits such interest to "qualified interest" or,
generally, fixed payments made at least annually. Treasury Regulation
section 25.2702-2 (2005) further limits such "qualified interest," yet
specifies that retention of the right to revoke a spouse's interest does not
disqualify the grantor's (retained) interest. An accompanying example
provides facts very similar to those in Schott (using a ten-year period rather
than fifteen) and clarifies that both the annuity to the grantor and the
possible remainder to the spouse are qualified interest that should be valued
under special rules provided in the regulation.1 0 4 These rules take into
account surviving spouse situations (so-called two-life valuations) for the
purposes of valuing the qualified interest and calculating the gift tax due. 105
The Ninth Circuit simply applied the example to the facts of the case
and determined that the retained interest was sufficiently fixed and
ascertainable, using valuation tables prescribed by the Service. 10 6 Thus, the
retained interest was "qualified" and should reduce the value of the gift
made by the Schotts.1 07 Yet, in accepting the taxpayer's position, the Court
of Appeals reversed the Tax Court decision in favor of the government,
which argued that the element of contingency in the Schotts' trust with
respect to the spouse's respective remainder interests was meaningful
9 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1600 (2001), rev'd, 319 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2003).
1 Schott, 319 F.3d at 1204-05.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 I.R.C. § 2702.
' Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(d), ex. 7 (2005).
105 id.
106 Schott, 319 F.3d at 1205-07.
107 Id. at 1207.
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enough to disqualify (not count) such interest for the purposes of gift tax
calculations.108 The government saw such contingency in the impossibility
of predicting the actual term of the annuities (life of the couple) and
consequently the start date of the spouse's remainder payments. The Court
of Appeals disposed of these arguments based on the general acceptance of
life annuities and the availability of valuation tables to deal with that.109 At
the end of the day, the difference between the Tax Court and the Ninth
Circuit was in their reading of an example on point. The Tax Court viewed
the example as an unreasonable extension of the regulation. Based on
purposive interpretation (purpose being the prevention of undervaluation of
gifts), the Tax Court rejected contingencies in the structuring of these
trusts.110 The Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that such rejection was not a
reasonable reading of the statute and regulation, thereby accepting the
example as authority and explicitly avoiding an analysis of its status.I1
In conclusion, in Schott one again sees conflicting views regarding the
proper treatment of regulatory examples. Here, the two courts took different
views with different outcomes in the actual case, based on their
interpretation of an example. Not only have the courts not engaged in a
comprehensive analysis of the role of examples in tax regulations to fill the
gap left by the legislator and regulators, they have added to the confusion
even when required to rule exclusively based on language included in such
examples. Next, the article begins the analysis with a discussion of the
clientele of regulatory examples. Identifying the proper audience of
examples provides better focus for the later discussion of their proper
purpose, since experts and the less informed may use examples
differently. 112
III. FOR WHOM ARE EXAMPLES WRITTEN?
Clientele questions are difficult in the realm of law, yet the focus of
this article is on the use of regulatory examples by experts and their
interpretation of these examples. The survey targeted only experienced tax
practitioners, since it sought to establish the real impact, and flaws, of the
use of examples in tax regulations.11 3 One cannot seriously expect less
informed taxpayers to peruse extensively the regulations and examples,
1os Id. at 1205-07.
109 Id.
"io Schott v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1600 (2001).
... Schott v. Commissioner, 319 F.3d 1203, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2003).
112 See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, How PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND,
EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL: THE EXPANDED EDITION 31-50 (Nat'1 Acad. Press ed. 2000)
[hereinafter How PEOPLE LEARN].
113 See supra note 22.
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master them, and take a tax position based on such research. The law
applies to all and is presumed to be known by all,1 14 yet, in the current legal
system only experts are practically expected to delve below its surface in
the tax context.1 15 There should also be no doubt that regulations are always
written for experts and by experts. It is important to note the clientele of a
legal instrument, such as examples, since experts and the less informed
apply them differently. 116 Experts have acquired expertise and therefore
have more prior knowledge on which to base new learning. Research
demonstrates that experts are quicker to notice details, put them in context,
organize, and interpret them, and they do all this far better than novices.11 7
Therefore, experts have an advantage in thinking about, understanding,
learning, and memorizing1 18 new details within their field when compared
to the less informed.119 They are better at identifying relevant patterns, and
therefore they are better at solving professional problems. 120 Consequently,
when an author of a regulation drafts an example for an expert, she does not
have to explain everything or provide every possible factual element,
relevant or not, but only what an expert would need to interpret the
regulatory language correctly. She could also use some professional terms
without further explanation and without the concern that a nonexpert would
confuse it with - for instance, the colloquial meaning of the term. Most
importantly, an expert would not need many reminders or explicit cross
references to other relevant rules and definitions that would be imperative
for a novice if she wished to draw conclusions about the accurate legal
consequence relevant to the example. Note, however, that expertise is not
always beneficial; certain biases are exacerbated by expertise, since experts
may be less open than laymen to consider atypical yet possibly relevant
114 Ignorantia juris non excusat is of course a universal maxim. It includes exceptions
and derogations, yet in the context of this article, it basically applies in its pure form. For an
interesting modem American reevaluation of this principle, albeit through the ubiquitous
criminal law prism, see, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined,
17 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 671 (1976).
115 A challenge of this basic understanding would require a very different argument that
would be beyond the scope of this article.
116 See, e.g., How PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 112; MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK T.
KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDENT'S HANDBOOK 459-98 (6th ed. 2010)
(reviewing generally the research on expertise and problem solving).
117 See supra note 116.
118 Note the differences between these related processes. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON,
THINKING AND DECIDING 22, 26-29 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining especially that understanding
requires more than memorization and that it is purpose based, elaborating on various theories
about these processes).
119 See, e.g., supra note 116.
120 See, e.g., supra note 116.
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circumstances and interpretations. 121 This article demonstrates below that in
these circumstances examples written by experts predominantly for experts
may be counterproductive.
The distinction between experts and the less informed taxpayers is not
sufficient, however, to fully comprehend the impact of examples on the
practice of tax law in general and on regulatory interpretation in particular.
This impact varies even among tax professionals. In a 1991 article, Marty
McMahon wrote: "tax professionals obviously are the only people who
need to understand the regulations, as long as they are able to communicate
to their clients the impact of the rules."1 22 McMahon, consistent with the
view expressed above, clearly believes that the primary goal of regulation
drafting should be to maximize their precision and effectiveness. He is
(justifiably) less worried about the uninformed public's reading of such
regulations. McMahon continues, however, noting:
It does not suffice that the regulations are understandable to the
members of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section or
the ABA Tax Section, who comment on them or are consulted
informally during the drafting process. All of these people have the
time and resources to master the few provisions of the code and
regulations that have been assigned to them or in which they are
interested at the time. Rather, in general, our concern must be with
the CPA in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, the small firm lawyer in
Dayton, Ohio, the revenue agent in Bakersfield, California, and the
Chief Counsel docket attorney in Boise, Idaho. These people are
the typical front-line tax professional. 123
These comments were made in the context of the complexity of
regulations in general, yet they are equally relevant to the analysis of
regulatory examples. Of course, neither McMahon nor this article argues
that certain lawyers are inherently more capable than others. Rather, the
reality is that most taxpayers do not have access to the absolute best-
informed tax advice and, more importantly, that the resources available to
the average capable tax adviser may be limited, in terms of time,
knowledge, legal sources, and current inside information about the
Service's precise position on all matters. The point is that it is not sufficient
simply to distinguish between experts and the less informed taxpayers; the
author of the regulations and the examples should have a more nuanced
vision of her (expert) clientele in mind when drafting. McMahon
121 See, e.g., BARON, supra note 118. The availability bias, for example, has such
opposite effects. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 501-02.
122 See McMahon, supra note 7, at 1442.
123 See McMahon, supra note 7, at 1443.
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convincingly argues that regulations should be generally written with the
average capable tax expert in mind. 124
An even more nuanced view is possible, which McMahon seems to
accept:
To be sure, there are some cases in which the audience consists
mainly of more sophisticated and specialized tax practitioners.
They are in larger firms, have more time, and their clients are able
and willing to pay higher fees to reflect the time necessary to
comprehend the regulations. Thus, regulations dealing with
complex underlying transactions may be drafted differently from
those which must be applied and understood universally.1 25
This view would require the author of the regulations (and the
examples) to make judgment calls about the potential clientele. This view is
pragmatically appealing. The assumption is that the author of the regulation
is one of the best-informed experts, and hence she is positioned to best
make these judgment calls. In the examples context, however, it is less
appealing. First, this article's point of departure is the critique of the
unlimited discretion effectively granted to regulation authors to add
examples. Keeping such unlimited discretion in the context of clientele may
circumvent the educated approach to example drafting advocated by the
article. Second, regulation authors and the examples they draft are not
neutral - they are part of the government, and an unlimited discretion
about the level of sophistication of the clientele may help to mask the
inappropriate use of examples, such as the targeting of specific taxpayers,
as elaborated below. Note that intentional "nudging" is not problematic in
this context, since appropriate nudges must be explicit and choice
permitting. 126
Third, not all regulation authors are necessarily the very best-informed
tax experts, and the distinction between levels of expertise expected from
the clientele of different rules is complex. Relatedly, the most sophisticated
experts may have more influence with the government and more resources
to assert their influence. Consequently, a single standard for clientele is
likely the most desirable when authors come to draft regulatory examples.
A single standard of writing for the average capable tax expert does not
mean that the most complex matters cannot be addressed with appropriate
expertise and sophistication; it only means that if examples are added, they
should be accessible for the average capable tax expert and not only for the
124 See McMahon, supra note 7, at 1443.
125 See McMahon, supra note 7, at 1443.
126 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 28.
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most sophisticated. Such practices would prevent the excessive use of
specialized terminology, nontransparent references, and particular targeting
of taxpayer actions or transactions. Focusing on average, capable tax
experts rather than the most sophisticated tax experts may also be useful to
reduce the impact of the increased exposure of experts to cognitive biases
mentioned above. 127 Finally, such a standard would make the regulations
more accessible to nontax experts who, as conceded, are not the primary
clientele of the regulations. Yet, at the end of the day, the clients are the
ones to whom the experts must explain the basic norms. Approachable
regulations (as explained by experts), especially in the expectedly
approachable form of regulatory examples, should go a long way to
increase legitimacy of the entire norm system, further supporting the
average capable tax expert standard advocated by this article.1 28
The undesirability of the drafting practices mentioned above is further
elaborated below, 129 yet the problem with targeting examples is worth
mentioning here, even though it typically deals with sophisticated, complex
transactions that are usually handled by tax experts from the largest firms.,
Nonetheless, targeting examples may easily have grave implications for less
sophisticated taxpayers and their tax advisers who may not be aware of the
exact context of an example or, more importantly, the detailed
circumstances of the targeted transaction. A good example of this issue is
the recent so-called inversion regulationsl 30 that responded to the concern
of the government with inversion transactions generally,131 yet were written
127 See supra note 121.
128 For the importance of legitimacy for compliance, see Tyler, supra note 21, at 804,
818, 822 (explaining that people comply better with norms that agree with their perception
of what's right, arguing for procedural justice as generally more effective than deterrence to
achieve compliance, especially long-term compliance that is important for taxation, and
mentioning specifically that people pay taxes even when they do not support the policies
supported by such taxes so long as they accept the legitimacy of the tax system and its
general fairness). Tyler mentions the similarity of his conclusions to these of Margaret Levi,
who focused on the deterrence model in tax compliance, since even Levi acknowledged that
coercion is insufficient, requiring government to achieve quasi-voluntary compliance to
make the tax system efficient. Tyler, supra note 21, at 872 (citing MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE
AND REVENUE (1988)).
129 See infra Parts IV-V.
130 See Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,858 (Apr. 8, 2016)
(explaining that these regulations should be viewed in combination with the proposed § 385
regulations that, among other things, decrease some of the most important benefits of
inversions); Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,912 (Apr. 8, 2016).
131 See, e.g., Mike Patton, Will Inversions Sink the U.S. Economy?, Forbes (Aug. 12,
2014, 5:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/08/12/will-tax-inversions-
sink-the-u-s-economy/#271707465d30 (explaining this not-so-recent concern has been
infused with political agenda, such as advocacy of tax cuts, blaming the high nominal United
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with a fairly transparent aim at the proposed Pfizer-Allergan merger1 32 that
eventually fell through.1 3 3 Next, the article begins to examine the desirable
uses of regulatory examples while keeping in mind the appropriate clientele
of the examples: the average capable tax expert.
IV. WHY EXAMPLES?
This part of the article examines the reasons for the prevalent use of
regulatory examples, explaining their intuitive appeal to both regulation
authors and users, and beginning to expose the potential downside of this
practice. It begins with the various reasons for inclusion of examples in tax
regulations.
A. Why Would One Wish to Include Examples in Tax Regulations?
The limitations of language in the writing of laws and regulations are
well known and have long been studied.134 The writing of rules must strike
a balance between accuracy and clarity for such rules to be effective. This
balance is at the heart of the discussion of regulatory examples, because the
States corporate income tax rate); see also CFO Network: Obama Admin. Concerned About
Inversions, Wall Street Journal (June 17, 2014, 2:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/video/cfo-
network-obama-admin-concemed-about-inversions/346D2F70-7292-4267-AEBF-
5Fl6A42A0F81.html.
132 On November 2015, Pfizer, a United States corporation and Allergan, an Irish
corporation announced a merger that would have combined them into the world's largest
pharmaceutical company. The surviving corporation would have been Irish. The deal would
have resulted in the biggest "inversion" transaction to date. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Pfizer
and Allergan Poised to Announce History's Biggest Healthcare Merger, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 22, 2015, 3:27 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/22/pfizer-
allergan-healthcare-merger-corporate-tax.
133 See Pfizer Announces Termination of Proposed Combination with Allergan, PFIZER
(Apr. 6, 2016, 6:45 AM), http://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-
detail/pfizer announces termination of..proposedcombination with-allergan.
134 Yet, as already mentioned, this is beyond the scope of this article. For more on that
tension, See generally, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW (John Gibbons ed., 2013) (exploring the
complex relationship and limitations between law and language, emphasizing the importance
of effective communications); Gregory Matoesian, Language and Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLrNGUISTICS 701, 701-19 (Robert Bayley, et al. eds., 2013) (focusing on
the complex yet elusive relationship between language, law, and sociocultural context,
paying particular attention to the role of power in legal discourse); Rabeea Assy, Can the
Law Speak Directly to its Subjects? The Limitation of Plain Language, 38 J.L. & Soc'Y 376
(2011) (arguing that the plain English movement has exaggerated the capacity of plain
language to render the law intelligible to the nonlawyer, obscuring the deeper question of
legal complexity by focusing solely on language and style); David Olson, From Utterance to
Text: The Bias of Language in Speech and Writing, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 257 (1977)
(discussing generally the various meanings of language in different contexts).
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immediate reason for writing examples is to improve the clarity of complex
tax rules. 135 Relatedly, the so-called "plain language movement"1 36 was
successful in advocating more clarity in legal norm writing with the passage
of the Plain Writing Act of 2010, marshaled by Cass Sunstein and then-
President Barack Obama.1 37 Regardless of one's view of this specific act,
the logic behind it'3 8 follows the same logic of the writing of examples into
tax regulations, both having clarity and certainty in mind.1 39
This logic is also highly intuitive: a regulation's author understands the
limitations of language, especially since she herself is bound by the
statutory language drafted by others. She understands the need to conform
to the standard style and format of other regulations, and she is aware of her
own literary limitations. In addition, the author is human, no sarcasm
intended, and hence she understands the power of examples in thinking,
understanding, and learning. The use of examples in learning is ubiquitous,
well studied, and universally appreciated.1 40 The process of learning new
things involves what cognitive scientists call "encoding,"141 as part of
mediation processes between the stimulus (what one reads, for instance)
and the response of the brain (thinking about it or memorizing it).1 42
135 As it appears from informal discussions with Treasury officials. See supra note 15.
136 See generally, PLAIN LANGUAGE: IMPROVING COMM. FROM FED. GOv'T TO PUB.,
www.plainlanguage.gov (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
137 Pub. L. No. 111-274, 124 Stat. 2861 (2010); see also Plain Language: It's the Law,
PLAIN LANGUAGE: IMPROVING COMM. FROM FED. GOv'T TO PUB.,
www.plainlanguage.gov/plLaw (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
138 See FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 20.
139 Indeed, the federal guidelines include a specific recommendation to include
regulatory examples, with a special mention of the extensive use of examples in tax
regulation. See FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at 70. They assert:
"(E)xamples help you clarify complex concepts, even in regulations. They are an ideal way
to help your readers. In spoken English, when you ask for clarification of something, people
often respond by giving you an example. Good examples can substitute for long
explanations. The more complex the concept you are writing about, the more you should
consider using an example. By giving your audience an example that's relevant to their
situation, you help them relate to your document." FEDERAL PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDELINES,
supra note 20, at 70. This article supports some of these notions, yet cautions against others.
See infra Parts IV.A.1-V. Such caution is supported by research conducted in related fields.
See, e.g., Samuel B. Bonsall IV, Andrew J. Leone, Brian P. Miller & Kristina Rennekamp, A
Plain English Measure of Financial Reporting Readability, 63 J. ACCT. & EcON. 329, 329-
30 (2017) (attempting to establish measures for readability of financial disclosures and
conducting validation experiments, noting the difficulty of measuring readability even in a
field where explicit SEC guidance is available).
140 See, e.g., supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
141 Nugent, Pam M.S., "Encoding," in PsychologyDictionary.org, Apr. 7, 2013,
https://psychologydictionary.org/encoding/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2017).
142 This paragraph is based on ample research in cognitive psychology about learning,
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Moreover, such encoding reoccurs when one retrieves whatever she
originally stored when she later wishes to reuse it. 143 Humans therefore do
not just store received information; they constantly interpret it. Similarly,
they do not retrieve exactly what they had previously stored for later use, as
the brain is not merely a tape recorder. Cognitive processes rely heavily on
existing knowledge in the learning and understanding of such "new"
material, as well as on context and the immediate goals of the person
processing the information.'" The use of examples therefore facilitates
thinking and learning by making connections between the new information
and known information. At the same time, however, what one learns and
understands is affected by previous knowledge, including examples; this
prior knowledge accompanies the new information and influences its
encoding. The author of regulations intuitively knows that the use of
examples can make the regulations easier to understand, and to understand
them in the manner she (the regulations author) wishes them to be
understood. Thus, the author believes examples make her regulations more
effective. She is naturally less aware of the prior knowledge (baggage) users
bring with them, and the inherent lack of neutrality of her own examples
and the bias they may introduce, changing the way the user of the
regulations learns, understands, and eventually applies them.
The bias introduced by examples, like any other stimuli, is inherent in
human cognition. Cognitive biases occur due to mental shortcuts (also
known as heuristics) that we humans regularly use for effective thinking. 145
We cannot - and do not - stop and think through every step we take and
every problem presented to us in our daily affairs. Daniel Kahneman
thinking and understanding. See, e.g., ALAN BADDELEY, HUMAN MEMORY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (Psychology Press rev. ed. 1997).
143 Id. at 5-6.
144 See, e.g., How PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 112, at 10-12.
145 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (1st ed. 2013) (containing
a popular review of a lifetime of notable work on cognitive biases, mostly while working
with Amos Tversky, for which Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences).
Legal scholarship has extensively discussed this understanding about human cognition,
primarily in the context of analysis of the limitations of classic law and economics literature.
These limitations, a consequence of what is often called "bounded rationality," were
explored in both theory and application, based on the insight that humans are not rational, or
that their rationality is commonly bounded. See e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471
(1998) (explaining bounded rationality and its impact on law and economics scholarship);
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006)
(explaining how the law can be used to negate bounded rationality actively, through what
they call debiasing, and not only in attempts to isolate the bias from the decision-making
process).
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describes this in terms of thinking "fast" and "slow." 1 46 Fast thinking and
behavior are highly important for us to timely, i.e., quickly, respond to
stimuli in circumstances that cannot tolerate "slow," rigorous, and
comprehensive thought processes that fully gather and analyze all available
data prior to decision. 147 Fast thinking also permits us to make more
decisions, and be more effective in the majority of situations we face in life,
situations that do not require deep analysis prior to decision, or situations in
which the consequences of sub-optimal decisions would not be critical. 148
Survival instincts are good examples of the necessity of fast thinking.1 49
But, even less extreme examples, such as driving and other daily chores
demonstrate the importance of these fast mechanisms in our lives. 150 To
think fast, human minds create heuristics that help them operate in this
efficient manner. 151 One of the most well-known heuristics is the
availability heuristic.1 52 Humans engage in decision making and other
evaluations based first on what immediately comes to their minds (what is
"available"), building the rest of their thought on that existing
knowledge.1 53 Examples work well because they are available in the sense
that they require less "processing," and therefore they naturally trigger the
availability heuristic when they describe narratives or circumstances that
are easier to recall and relate to than the more general and abstract
regulatory language. Consequently, examples are helpful for the human
understanding of otherwise complex rules as they relate the rules to
simpler-to-access-and-recall existing knowledge. Yet, at the same time,
examples may steer one away from the intended focus or scope of the rules.
Such diversion may be unintentional, yet it may also be intentionally used
to manipulate one's focus or scope in directions not explicitly transparent in
the regulatory language itself.1 54 Intentional or unintentional, these
146 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 13, 20-22.
147 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 13, 20-22.
148 Slow thinking, conversely, is characterized by comprehensive gathering of data and
analysis, fit for more consequential situations in life where prompt decision-making is not
necessary and the likelihood of good decision-making without rigorous study and thought
processes is low. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 13, 20-22.
149 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 20-22.
1so See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 20-22.
151 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 109-99. For a more comprehensive study of
various heuristics and biases, see, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2002).
152 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Availability: A Heuristic for
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (exploring the
availability heuristic).
153 Id.
154 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 145, for an example of an attempt to use the bias to
direct behavior.
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diversions may be undesirable, as demonstrated by past studies, including
in the realm of tax law. 155 The core argument of this article is that in the
context of regulatory examples, we have ignored the impact of human
cognition and therefore have been incapable of assessing the desirability of
these regulatory examples, an exercise that the article wishes to initiate.
To better understand the impact of examples, this part of the article
explores, first, their potential aims and, second, the efficacy of such aims-
driven examples against the background of human cognition and its
limitations. This is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the tensions
between human cognition as science currently understands it and society's
perception of human understanding of the law. The article merely notes
some flaws in such perception, based on insights from cognition science
that could help a more educated writing of regulatory rules. 156 Next, the
article begins the discussion with a structured exposition of possible goals
for regulatory examples.
1. Examples that Provide Mere Illustrations of the Norms
This most straightforward goal of regulatory examples is to illustrate
norms. 157 An instance of this type of examples is the coffee example
mentioned above,' 5 8  giving coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks as
illustrations of occasional snacks that an employer is permitted to provide to
her employees free of tax (to the employees).1 59 Another example with a
similar purpose is Treasury Regulation section 1.1060-1(d) (2008) (the
section 1060 example1 60), which illustrates the ordering rule of Code
section 1060 (allocation of tax basis to assets of a target corporation in a
taxable acquisition) with plugged numbers.161 This latter example both
pours content into the words of the norm and demonstrates the use of a
formula provided by such norm. 162
155 See, e.g., Joshua D. Blank & Leigh Osofsky, Simplexity: Plain Language and the
Tax Law, 66 EMORY L.J. 395 (2017) (exploring the way that the Service presents tax law in
its nonbinding publications, the differences between such presentation and actual applicable
law, and the general unfavorable taxpayer consequences of such diversion).
156 This article uses learning and understanding as a proxy for what "we" (society) want
the constituency, taxpayers in this case, to do with the rules. A more precise discussion of
the relationship of taxpayers and tax law, while desirable, is beyond the scope of this article.
1 40% of the survey participants viewed this as the primary purpose of regulatory
examples. See supra note 22.
158 See supra Part 1.
159 See supra Part II.B.
160 See supra Part II.C.
161 Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(d) (2008). See supra Part I.C.
162 That is that generally in an asset acquisition the purchase price shall be allocated
first to the basis of the more liquid assets and later to the less liquid assets. The exact
275
276 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 37:243
Yet, even these examples are not neutral. The coffee example
necessarily distinguishes between the mentioned snacks and snacks not
mentioned, such as tea, cookies, and hot chocolate. 163 It does not clearly
state that the list mentioned is for illustration purposes only. Most lawyers
may interpret the example as merely illustrative, yet again, the mere
mention of certain list items without further clarification introduces a bias.
Moreover, the example does not set clear boundaries between "fancy"
coffee, which is likely, yet not clearly, unqualified as a de minimis fringe
benefit and regular, ubiquitous brands.1 6 4 Again, proper interpretation may
reach the right conclusion in many cases, but a clearer articulation would be
superior; it would moreover be less distortive, likely causing less change of
behavior among taxpayers. Think about a "fancy" tea example, which, this
article argues, would more likely be disqualified than "fancy" coffee as a de
minimis fringe benefit.
The authors of the regulations may use availability to their advantage,
and they may have already done so in this context. If they concluded that
many employers provide coffee, doughnuts, and soft drinks as a matter of
course, and that requiring employees to include the value of these items in
income would face strong resistance or just be ignored, then they probably
did the right thing by mentioning those items in the example and leaving
other, less ubiquitous snacks to the application of the general rule of the
regulatory language. Note, however, that they could have nudged employers
otherwise, mentioning health bars, apples, and freshly squeezed juice. The
point is not that one or another articulation is necessarily better or worse,
but that even seemingly innocent examples are not and cannot be neutral.1 65
Even the Code section 1060 example is not neutral, since the numbers
used could either be simple - raising no questions about the application of
the formula or the justifiability of the norm - or more realistic and reflect
difficult cases, such as bargain acquisitions or ones with significant
ordering rule prescribes several categories of assets (according to their liquidity). I.R.C. §
1060; Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(d) (2008).
163 See supra Part I.
164 See also Morse & Osofsky, supra note 14.
165 Note that this article does not support or oppose the use of nudges; it simply clarifies
that the basic premises are valid for regulation of all forms, including nudging. Further, the
typical arguments against paternalism levied against the use of nudges are of lesser
importance here, since, as demonstrated throughout this article, behavioral "imperfections,"
such as heuristics, impact both the authors of the regulatory examples and their users. See,
e.g., Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1625 (2006) (cautioning against
paternalistic regulation mainly based on the argument that the "long-run costs of paternalistic
regulations may often offset short-run gains because of the negative learning and
motivational effects").
2018] Towards More Behaviorally-Intelligent Regulation
premiums. 166 Yet, the purpose of the examples is merely to illustrate an
ordering rule that many people would perhaps take a longer time to figure
out if it were not supported by the numeric examples. Numeric illustrations
work well with ordering rules, formulae, and such, yet even they may be
manipulated to give illustrations meanings beyond their functionality. The
claim of this article is that one must at least be aware of this possibility
when writing or interpreting these examples. Nonnumeric specificity
examples, such as the coffee example,1 67 are less obviously justified as their
potential for bias is larger. Clear interpretation rules could be useful in this
regard.
2. Examples that Explain the Norms
Some examples go beyond mere illustration of the norms provided by
the regulatory language, as demonstrated above by the continuity-of-interest
example.1 68 There, the example effectively redefines the norms. The most
obvious need for these examples is in cases where the author of the
regulations believes that the regulatory language cannot be sufficiently clear
and therefore would benefit from the supplement of examples. Note that the
problem is not one of bad or inappropriate drafting, but of the very
limitations of the necessary use of language to articulate norms. One must
assume that the author of the regulations believed that proper interpretation
of the language should lead to the same conclusion with or without the
example, but that the addition of the example would allow readers to reach
the correct conclusion more simply, more quickly, and with greater
certainty. A less favorable perspective of this practice would raise the
possibility that regulation authors may over-rely on examples, permitting
themselves to less carefully draft the regulatory language itself when the
same ideas may be much more easily explained via examples.
In a way, this type of example is similar to the illustrative examples
mentioned above, yet it goes beyond mere illustration. Thirteen percent of
survey participants said this is the principal purpose of regulatory examples:
to add explanations to the rules when the regulatory language cannot do
166 In these not uncommon circumstances, taxpayers cannot simply assign value to all
numerated assets according to acceptable valuation methodologies. The assets either have no
assigned value or their value does not correspond to numerated assets. Both of these
situations create incentives for taxpayers to challenge, and perhaps be more creative with,
the valuation methods they use, in order to minimize their tax exposure. Such behavior often
results in conflicts between valuations used by sellers and buyers, and these conflicts may be
used by aggressive tax planners.
167 See supra Part I.
168 See supra Part I.B.
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so.
1 6 9 The transfer pricing example mentioned above provides another good
illustration of this type of examples, even if it is not a very good example of
desirable drafting of regulatory examples. 170 As a reminder: the example
dictates that under comparable circumstances, a taxpayer may select the
same price that it uses to license a product to an unrelated party in a
licensing transaction to a related party. 17 1 This is called an "internal
comparable" in the practice of tax law.1 72 In this context the regulations
apply the arm's length standard to establish necessary transfer prices, yet
this standard cannot be easily applied based on regulatory language alone. If
comparability of the nonmarket transaction to a market transaction is the
standard, then what is "sufficiently comparable"? The regulations specify
factors to aid the taxpayer in the determination of comparability, 173 yet the
value given to each factor is left for the judgment of whoever applies the
rules. It seems that the regulation author thought these difficult-to-interpret
norms can be best explained by examples, yet, naturally, these examples are
very powerful (obviously more powerful than the mere illustration of rules
that could be understood without them), and hence more vulnerable to bias.
This example is particularly interesting because it only pretends to
explain arm's length application. In reality, it tells an unrealistic story, and
hence it is quite useless for guidance purposes. The example could therefore
be abused. For instance, if the government wished to argue that only strict
comparability would permit the use of internal comparables, it would put a
very heavy burden on the taxpayer to establish such strict comparability.
Yet such interpretation would be ludicrous, and in fact it would be opposite
to the current government's support of internal comparables.1 74 Taxpayers
could also take advantage of this example if they wished to use
methodology other than the straightforward arm's length methodology. For
instance, taxpayers could argue that CUP requires strict comparability that
does not exist in their cases (or in any other cases), and therefore they
should be permitted to use other methods that may be more beneficial for
them (and result in less tax paid to the government). 175
169 See supra note 22.
170 See supra Part II.C; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(4), ex. 1 (2011).
71 See supra Part II.C.
172 See, e.g., STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-37-10, PRESENT
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 120
(2010).
173 See supra note 72.
174 See supra note 67.
175 These problems are not theoretical. They initiated the policy discussion that resulted
in the 1986 amendment of Code section 482 and the Service's 1988 White Paper titled A
Study of Intercompany Pricing under Section 482 of the Code. I.R.C. § 482 (1986); I.R.S.
Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458. See also Brauner, supra note 62 (reviewing case law
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In conclusion, explanatory examples are appropriate when they
accompany regulatory norms that are incomplete and language dependent.
Yet, some explanatory examples serve these norms poorly, and may
(intentionally or unintentionally) even subvert the norms' true purpose. The
transfer pricing example abovementioned is an example of such a
disservice. The reason for this example was likely that the authors of the
regulations wished to avoid the complexity of real transfer pricing
circumstances that depend heavily on facts and circumstances, and simply
cannot be helped by the relatively concise examples written in the structure
and length of those found in tax regulations.
Tax norms more often than not deal, however, with complex, highly
factual, and circumstance-sensitive norms, and crude simplification of
examples cannot reduce the difficulty of interpretation in such cases.
Another example of this difficulty is in the so-called software regulations
(hereafter the software regulation example). Treasury Regulation section
1.861-18 (1998) provides a general algorithm to aid taxpayers in the
classification of transactions in software ("computer programs" in the
language of the regulations). The regulation distinguishes between
transactions properly classified as services, the provision of know-how,
licenses of copyright rights, lease of copyrighted articles, and the sales of
either copyrighted articles or copyright rights.1 76 The distinction among
these types of transactions is important because, despite their habitual
economic similarity, their tax treatment is often different. 177 The algorithm
provided by the regulatory language has been generally considered very
useful in practice, even though its application is not simple or free from
doubts. 178 In fact, many countries have struggled with the same problems of
classifying complex software transactions, 179 and essentially all have
adopted versions of the United States's regulations.1 80 The algorithm is
struggling with comparability assessments for transactions involving intangibles).
176 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-18(d), 1.861-18(e), 1.861-18(f) (1998).
177 Many have commented on the logic of such different treatment yet this is beyond the
scope of this article. See also the IBA, Bar Association Comments on OECD Digital
Economy Tax Challenge Consultation, TAX NOTES (Dec. 18, 2013) (arguing that "the US
"software regulations" were generally considered to be obsolete by the time they were
finally published").
178 See, e.g., Tax Management Portfolio, Federal Taxation of Software and E-
Commerce, 555 U.S. INCOME PORTFOLIO (BNA) ¶ (I)(B)(1)(a)(1).
179 See, e.g., AUSTL. TAXATION OFFICE, TAX AND THE INTERNET (1997); ANDRE
VALLERAND, MINISTER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (CANADA),
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CANADA'S TAX ADMINISTRATION: A REPORT TO THE MINISTER
OF NATIONAL REVENUE FROM THE MINISTER'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE (1998).
8 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION DEv., TAX TREATY CHARACTERISATION
ISSUES ARISING FROM E-COMMERCE T 22 (2001), http://www.oecd.org/tax/
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supported by a set of examples that demonstrate its implementation; this
article focuses on Examples 8 and 9 of the regulations.
Example 8 provides the following factual pattern:
Corp A, a U.S. corporation, transfers a disk containing Program X
to Corp D, a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of personal computers in Country Z. Corp A grants Corp D
the nonexclusive right to copy Program X onto the hard drive of an
unlimited number of computers, which Corp D manufactures, and
to distribute those copies (on the hard drive) to the public. The
term of the agreement is two years, which is less than the
remaining life of the copyright in Program X. Corp D pays Corp A
an amount based on the number of copies of Program X it loads on
to computers.181
This is the classic original equipment manufacturer (OEM) agreement
between PC manufacturers and software corporations. Under the regulatory
language, the right to copy and sell to the public makes the transfer one of a
copyright right, and since it is limited in time it would be classified as a
license generating royalty income.182
The next example, Example 9, reads:
The facts are the same as in Example 8, except that Corp D, the
Country Z corporation, receives physical disks. The disks are
shipped in boxes covered by shrink-wrap licenses (identical to the
licenses described in Example 1). The terms of these licenses do
not permit Corp D to make additional copies of Program X. Corp
D uses each individual disk only once to load a single copy of
Program X onto each separate computer. Corp D transfers the disk
with the computer when it is sold.1 83
The analysis here says that no copyright right was transferred, since
Corp D has no copying rights, and therefore the transaction should be
treated as a sale of a copyrighted article.1 84 In this way, the transaction is
akin to the same of a music CD for personal consumption. This
classification has dramatic consequences; under the license classification
illustrated in Example 8, Corp D would typically be required to withhold
consunption/1923396.pdf, (referencing the Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18 (1998) software
regulation in the context of know-how and services).
181 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18, ex. 8(i) (1998).
182 Id. § 1.861-18, ex. 8(ii).
t Id. § 1.861-18, ex. 9(i).
184 Id. § 1.861-18, ex. 9(ii).
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tax - up to 30 percent of the gross amount in the United States - while no
withholding tax, or other United State tax, would typically be due under the
sale classification. 8 5
The reading of these examples together is coherent with the seemingly
logical algorithm for classification of software transactions, yet the
examples expose the weakness of the algorithm itself. The difference
between Examples 8 and 9 is who makes the copies of the program - a
clearly worthless action - and the delivery cost of the physical disks. The
goal of the regulations could not have been to impose the cost of producing
endless physical disks and delivering them to the client on software
companies, when they could easily engage in the exact same economic
transactions, via the internet for example, and avoid those costs. Yet, the
advantageous tax consequences of producing the physical product may push
taxpayers either to engage in wasteful activities or cheat and pretend to do
so.
Note, however, that Example 10186 clarifies that the author of the
regulations did not think that the mere control over copying is determinative
of the classification, rather, it is the copying "for the public" that worried
the author of the regulations.1 87 Under Example 10, Corp A enjoys the same
advantageous tax treatment as Example 9.188 It seems that the concern is
one of abuse and fraud, yet neither are directly addressed by the regulatory
language or the regulatory examples. The examples of the software
regulations therefore provide more than just illustration or even
explanations of the regulatory language; they infuse the rules with
nontransparent concerns, yet only in an implicit and incomprehensive
manner. This is problematic since it is impossible to infer a general anti-
abuse rule from these examples beyond the exact circumstance of Example
8.189
Second, the examples incentivize taxpayers either to engage in wasteful
185 Except for inventory sales in certain circumstances. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 865(b).
186 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18, ex. 10(i) (1998) ("Corp A, a U.S. corporation, transfers a
disk containing Program X to Corp E, a Country Z corporation, and grants Corp E the right
to load Program X onto 50 individual workstations for use only by Corp E employees at one
location in return for a one-time per-user fee (generally referred to as a site license or
enterprise license). If additional workstations are subsequently introduced, Program X may
be loaded onto those machines for additional one-time per-user fees. The license which
grants the rights to operate Program X on 50 workstations also prohibits Corp E from selling
the disk (or any of the 50 copies) or reverse engineering the program. The term of the license
is stated to be perpetual.").
'" Id. § 1.861-18, ex. 10(ii).
in Id. § 1.861-18, ex. 9.
189 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18, ex. 8 (1998).
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activities or cheat. 190 Third, the examples de facto prevent the government
from interpreting the regulatory language as a more general anti-abuse
norm, in a manner that would be consistent and workable in all
circumstances rather than only those mentioned in the examples. Examples
8-10 illustrate well the potential benefits of a general interpretation rule that
would always subject the regulatory examples to the regulatory language.
Finally, the revenue impact of these regulatory examples is likely negative
since software transactions are easily interchangeable, usually with little
cost. 19 1 Therefore, the primary impact of the regulatory examples is to
incentivize taxpayers to use less-taxed transactional forms, which not only
cost in revenue, but are also often wasteful.' 92
3. Examples that Shape the Contours of the Norm
Other examples go beyond explanations, clearly shaping the contours
of norms, shrinking or expanding their scope beyond the regulatory
language. Such regulatory examples are not rare; full 5% of our survey
participants viewed such contour shaping as the primary purpose of
regulatory examples as a whole.1 93 A sample follow-up inquiry with
participants clarified that they thought these examples usually appear where
the scope of the regulatory language is unclear;1 94 yet, the examples provide
more than specificity. They go beyond what could usually be perceived as
normal interpretation of the regulatory language. The continuity-of-interest
regulations' example, for instance, departs from the facts and circumstances
test and provides that 40 percent continuity is sufficient, anchoring
taxpayers to that percentage more powerfully than any other legal
analysis.1 95
The Parks casel96 provides an even more conspicuous instance of this
type of examples, since it does not deal with line drawing.1 97 As a reminder,
190 For example, to avoid the "bite" of copying a computer program, one could send
many (hundreds or even thousands of) CDs to ensure copyrighted article treatment, while the
very same thing could be achieved by copying multiple times from a single transmitted file
or a single CD or whatever medium.
191 See supra note 185.
192 In the economic sense, as they can change taxpayer behavior. See supra note 181-
185 and accompanying text (describing Examples 8 and 9).
193 See supra note 22.
194 See supra note 22.
195 See supra Part II.B. See infra Part IV.B.I for more on anchoring.
196 Parks v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 278 (2015).
197 Line drawing may be viewed as a necessary, imprecise rule in some cases, otherwise
many norms would end up in excessive litigation. Classic examples are age limits, for
driving, drinking, etc. Drinking at exactly 21 is okay, but a day earlier is illegal. Therefore,
examples of the line drawing variety may be more tolerable when they divert from wider
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this case revolved around radio advertisements that had been determined by
the Service to influence legislation and hence to be subject to excise
taxation under Code section 4945.198 The regulatory language makes
advertisements that "refer to" ballot measures subject to the excise tax, yet
it does not explain the level of reference required. 199 The Parks court did
not engage in the general interpretation of the term "refer to" in the context
of the regulations and their purpose but rather immediately and directly
resorted to the examples provided in the regulation. 200 These refer to
messages using language "widely used" or "identified with" specific
legislation to expand the prohibition. 201 The Court simply relied on the
examples to make the advertisements in question subject to the excise tax
with no further explanation.202 For the purposes of this Part, one can
observe that the examples expand the scope of the prohibition against
intervention in legislation provided for by the regulatory language. Such
expansion is not the only, and perhaps not even the most appropriate,
interpretation of the regulatory language.
Another interesting illustration of the problem with contour-shaping
examples is Treasury Regulation section 1.1275-5(d), Example 5 (1996)
(hereafter the VDRI example).203 This example requires a little background:
the regulation provides the conditions and rules for variable rate debt
instruments (VRDIs).204 It determines whether certain complex debt
instruments could be treated as debt for tax purposes (a usually favorable
treatment). 205 Example 5 concerns an instrument that is based on a fixed
regulatory language than compared to instances in nonline drawing circumstances. But see
David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L.
REv. 1627 (1999), and its corollary David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line
Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71 (2000) (arguing that line drawing decisions
should follow efficiency analysis and not traditional tax law doctrine). The obvious
conclusion is that not every line in tax law is necessarily drawn in the most desirable place
and better thinking may improve the law with little cost, both generally and particularly in
the case of regulatory examples.
19 Parks, 145 T.C. at 298.
199 Id. at 308.
200 Id. at 308-09.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 I thank Omri Marian for this example. See Omri Marian & Andrew D. Moin,
Taxation of Structured Debt in a Low-Rate Environment, 135 TAX NOTEs 323 (Apr. 16,
2012) for a more detailed explanation of the rules briefly explained here.
204 A variable rate debt instrument that does not qualify as VRDI is treated, less
favorably, as contingent payment debt instrument. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5(a)(1) (1996).
205 Basically, VRDIs are debt instruments that provide for stated interest, compounded
or paid at least annually, at: one or more qualified floating rates; a single fixed rate and one
or more qualified floating rates; a single objective rate; or a single fixed rate and a single
2018] 283
Virginia Tax Review
percentage of the S&P 500 index, and asks whether this should be
considered a reference to an "objective rate," therefore making the
instrument eligible to be a more beneficially taxed VRDI. 206 The example
claims that it should not, despite the fact that this often-used index seems to
clearly fall within the scope of the general definition of an "objective
rate." 207 This general definition is limited to rates that do not provide for
significant front-loading or back-loading of interest because such
disproportional loading presumably provides excessive control to the
taxpayer over the risk embedded in the instrument. 208 The example assumes
that the S&P 500 index is liable, based on historical data, to always increase
in value and hence result in significant "back-loading," which disqualifies
the instrument at stake as a VRDI.
The point for purposes of this article is that the example seriously
limits the scope of the VRDI rules with its expansion of what significant
front- or back-loading means, including every index that has had
consistently positive historical performance. This effectively analogizes the
S&P 500 to an index where performance is within the control of the
taxpayer - an obviously problematic analogy. Moreover, the example's
conclusion about the historical performance of the S&P 500 index is also
false because the index has not always trended upwards. It lost value in
several years, including two losing periods in 2000-2002 and 2008-2009.209
Finally, the example uses historical data trends, with no specificity, whereas
the regulatory language refers to actual risk - front- and back-loading. It is
not clear why the authors of the regulation treated the S&P 500 this way.
Perhaps they thought that VRDI treatment should be more restrictive than
the treatment provided for by the regulatory language, yet forcing this
opinion through the examples rather than the approved regulatory language
is problematic at best. Another possibility is that the authors of the
regulations wanted to target a specific instrument, tied to the S&P 500, that
they had encountered, an equally common and problematic practice, as
objective rate that is a qualified inverse floating rate. Id. § 1.1275-5(a)(2).
206 Id. § 1.1275-5(a)(1), ex. 5.
207 See id. § 1.1275-5(c)(1) (providing that "an objective rate is a rate (other than a
qualified floating rate) that is determined using a single fixed formula and that is based on
objective financial or economic information. For example, an objective rate generally
includes a rate that is based on one or more qualified floating rates or on the yield of actively
traded personal property (within the meaning of I.R.C. §1092(d)(1)").
208 Id. § 1.1275-5(c)(4) (providing that "[n]otwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this
section, a variable rate of interest on a debt instrument is not an objective rate if it is
reasonably expected that the average value of the rate during the first half of the instrument's
term will be either significantly less than or significantly greater than the average value of
the rate during the final half of the instrument's term").
209 See, e.g., S&P 500 Index Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/spy/historical (last visited Oct. 31, 2017).
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explained next.
4. Examples that Target Specific Taxpayer Actions or Transactions
While the abovementioned three types of examples demonstrate a
progressively meaningful role for regulatory examples, this subsection is
qualitatively different. Targeting examples do not attempt to alter the scope
of the regulatory norm, but rather attempt to guarantee that specific
taxpayer actions or transactions are disqualified from certain tax benefits.
Put simply, a supposedly general and abstract norm is devised with
intentional over-coverage and disregard for its unintentional victims to
ensure that a single intended victim would not escape it. Regulatory
examples are "natural" for this practice since they provide an additional
guarantee that the intended target of the regulation would not escape it, as
examples facilitate the mention of a more specific set of facts than typical
regulatory language.
Again, this practice is not rare: approximately 5 percent of the survey
participants view targeting as the primary goal of regulatory examples as a
whole. 2 10 The recent regulations targeting inversions provide a good
example for this practice.21 1 They were clearly crafted to prevent the
announced Pfizer-Allergan merger. 2 12 In this case, not only the examples,
but also some of the details provided for in the regulatory language, serve
this purpose.
In the last two decades, Congress, and even more so the federal
government, made the fight against inversion transactions a focal point of
their tax policies. 213 Various laws and regulations construct the defense
against these transactions based on a scheme to eliminate or reduce their tax
benefits.2 14 This would be generally possible if after the transaction less
than 25 percent of the inverted MNE's business activity is in the parent's
residence, and the shareholders of the old United States parent end up
owning at least 60 percent of the shares of the new foreign parent.2 15 If a
stake of 80 percent or more is kept with these shareholders, the result would
210 See supra note 22.
211 See Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,858 (Apr. 8, 2016)
(explaining that these regulations should be viewed in combination with the proposed § 385
regulations that, among other things, decrease some of the most important benefits of
inversions); Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 81 Fed.
Reg. 20,912 (Apr. 8, 2016).
212 See supra Part II.
213 See, e.g., Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 6-9 (2015).
214 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7874.
215 id.
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be treatment as a United States corporation. 216 But, not unexpectedly, new
inversions were designed to circumvent these rules, and new guidance was
issued in 2014-2016 to plug new holes discovered in the defense against
- - 217inversions.
The Pfizer-Allergan deal was not designed to meet the 60 percent
threshold and would not have suffered adverse consequences if it were not
for the Treasury Regulation section 1.7874-8T. 2 18 The regulation addresses
corporations known as multiple inverters, i.e., MNEs, that engage in a
series of inversions - or acquisitions of United States corporations by
foreign companies - each inversion escapes the 60 percent threshold, but,
if viewed cumulatively, cover a much larger majority of assets with United
States origins. 219 The trick is that once an inversion passes the 60 percent
test, the entirety of the new MNE becomes "foreign" for the purposes of the
next inversion. This is possible even when all of the relevant transactions
include a majority of United States assets. The government's response in
the temporary regulations was to take a cumulative (three years) approach
for the calculation of the 60 percent test.220 This approach would eliminate
the tax benefits of the Pfizer merger, and indeed Pfizer announced that it
would not proceed with the transaction. People "in the know" testify that
the examples, demonstrating the calculation of the continued stake of the
old shareholders of the inverted companies, track the facts relevant to Pfizer
and Allergan.221 The regulations both over-reach by effectively burdening
legitimate transactions - for example in the case of a struggling American
corporation where a foreign takeover is the sole hope of survival and
continued employment of workers within the United States - and under-
reach, since other inversions may be designed to escape their grasp in the
same way that Pfizer/Allergan was allegedly designed to escape current
law.
There are many difficulties with these regulations, and indeed a lawsuit
is pending, challenging primarily the authority of the government to issue
these regulations. 222 However, for purposes of this article, other questions
are more relevant: Are regulatory examples the appropriate format for
specific targeting, especially when the regulatory language may otherwise
be interpreted in a more or less expansive manner? Are targeting examples
216 Id.
217 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712; I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 201549
I.R.B. 775.
218 Treas. Reg. § 1-7874-8T (2016).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See supra note 22.
222 See Complaint at 20-21, Chamber of Commerce v. I.R.S., No. 1:16-cv-944 (W.D.
Tex. filed Aug. 4, 2016).
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still "examples"? There is also a question of proportionality and alternative
means, including the use of explicit regulatory language or revenue
rulings. 223 Finally, specific targeting raises questions about the wisdom of
such regulations that are unlikely to be considered with a wide perspective
and rigid analysis and consideration of all the consequences. The regulation
author clearly focused on the specific target, rather than the exact
boundaries set by the regulation, including the boundary between
appropriate and inappropriate transactions. The user of the regulation,
however, has the legitimate choice between reliance on the original target of
the regulation, based on the regulatory example, or a normal reading of the
regulatory language. A difficult interpretation conflict is inescapable. In
conclusion, these examples are simply unlikely to provide good general
normative guidance.
5. Examples Written Without Specific Goals
Even worse are regulatory examples written as a matter of habit with
no specific goal in mind. Although a small minority, about 2 percent of
survey participants, stated that examples are primarily written because of
tradition and with no explicit goals, essentially all the follow-up participants
acknowledged the ubiquity of this phenomenon.224 Private conversations
with government officials made it clear that authors of regulations are now
expected to add examples and follow standard drafting, and they are
expected to do so with no guidance or much thought of the value they add
to the regulations. This view portrays quite a poor picture of the practice of
regulation writing, yet it should not be dismissed outright. It corresponds to
the findings about the impact of regulatory examples. As mentioned above,
47 percent of participants said the examples often describe simplistic or
unrealistic circumstances and therefore add little or nothing to the
regulations. 22 5 In addition, 43 percent of participants said the examples
often rehash the language of the regulations without adding clarity. 226 The
transfer pricing example on comparability in the context of pharmaceutical
distribution serves as a good illustration of this type of example. 227 The
point is not to condemn regulation authors, who are undoubtedly under
much pressure and often tight schedules, but rather highlight the deficiency
in the process. The intuitive appeal. of examples mentioned above 22 8 and
223 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 7.
224 See supra note 22.
225 See supra note 22.
226 See supra note 22.
227 See supra Part I.C.
228 See supra Parts IV.A.1-IV.A.5.
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further explained in cognitive bias terms in the following sections 229 likely
prevent the regulation authors from challenging this practice.
6. Examples Are Often Used for Various, Divergent Purposes, Appropriate
and Inappropriate
More than one-third of survey participants stated that one cannot say
the examples primarily serve a single purpose, but rather they serve all the
above-mentioned purposes interchangeably. 230 This is a reasonable account
of the current state of affairs, yet it raises a question about the desirability of
simply giving regulation authors unmitigated discretion over when, and to
what end, to add regulatory examples. It also makes regulatory
interpretation more difficult and uncertain. For instance, the lack of
guidance on examples led to the inclusion of controversial targeting
examples, such as those in the temporary inversion regulations mentioned
above. 231 The difficulty presented by the lack of guidance is exacerbated by
the typical complexity of identifying a purpose when none is declared.
Targeting examples may, for instance, be portrayed as merely illustrative,
leaving harmed taxpayers with little remedy,232 and the regulation author is
effectively free to not explain her actions. Similarly, the regulation author
may continue to add aimless or useless examples, such as the transfer
pricing example discussed above 233 with little chance of control over her
actions. The natural outcome of these shortcoming in forming clear
purposes for the use of regulatory examples is confusion, bias, and harm to
the legitimacy of the tax system. 234 The next section explains the reasons
for this state of affair. This article does not argue that it is a result only of
laziness and complicity among regulation authors but, conversely, that it is
a natural outcome of the way humans think and operate, adding that the
failures identified may be corrected by a better understanding of their
source at human cognition.
229 See infra Part IV.B.
230 See supra note 22.
231 See supra Part III; supra Part IV.A.4.
232 Assuming, arguendo, that targeting examples are or may be considered
inappropriate.
233 See supra Part II.C.
234 A good example for this is the state of the regulations promulgated pursuant to
I.R.C. § 704(b). See, e.g., Tax Attorney Says Partnership Regs Require Major Changes, 2012
TNT 246-15 (Dec. 19, 2012).
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B. Behavioral Insights that May Be Relevant for the Writing ofRegulatory
Examples
As noted, the attraction to examples in many circumstances, and their
intuitive appeal in interpretation of complex tax law are deeply rooted in the
human psyche. The lack of self-examination by regulation authors
regarding the use of regulatory examples is therefore understandable.
Similarly, the large majority of tax professionals who were interviewed
while researching this article were puzzled by the questioning of this
practice while contemporaneously strongly criticizing the practice itself.23 5
The interviewees came from both the government and private practice, and
there was no significant difference in attitude toward the examples among
them.236 An informal survey of tax professionals involved in the writing
and authorization of regulations revealed almost a consensus that examples
are necessary and are to be encouraged in any regulatory project.237 These
regulation authors felt no need for specific guidance and limits put on the
use of such examples, essentially viewing this article as a pointless
challenge of the obvious.
This section examines this approach, its sources, and its justifiability,
using insights from behavioral science. It may seem trivial that these
insights should guide the law and regulation writing, and routinely be
consulted in legal scholarship. In reality, these insights are rarely
acknowledged. They are mostly ignored in acceptance of the fictions like
general, complete familiarity with the law and perfect rationality of law-
subjects.23 8 This is slowly changing with the ascent of the so-called
behavioral law and economics school,2 39 yet tax scholarship has been slow
to join this trend. In addition, the application of behavioral science, and
particularly of insights from cognitive psychology, despite their relevance,
is not always simple or straightforward since it requires application of what
is essentially laboratory findings to complex, imperfect real life
235 See supra note 22
236 The interviewees were randomly chosen among the tax experts to whom the survey
had been sent. They included Service employees, yet not actual regulation authors. See supra
note 22.
237 In conformity with the implicit position of the Service, which was confirmed by
high-level officials. See supra note 22.
238 Similarly, the law has been slow to take into account the behavioral aspects of
government agencies' conduct. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 487-89 (arguing that
administrative law generally treats the agency as a black box and explaining that such an
assumption is incomplete, as it ignores behavioral impact on decision making by agency
officers); Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG.
253 (2011) (arguing for the exploitation of the salience bias in designing or modifying taxes).
239 See, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 145.
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circumstances, which makes conclusions useful, yet tentative, requiring
caution and care in application. 240 Cognition study has been interested in
behavior in a variety of contexts, such as learning, memorization, and
cognitive development. These circumstances are informative for a study of
the way taxpayers and their advisors read and use the law generally and
regulations and regulatory examples particularly, yet they are sufficiently
different that caution is warranted in an application of insights from
cognitive studies to the reading and use of regulatory examples; 24 1
examples must be understood, learned, and perhaps retained to memory, yet
they are not, and perhaps should not necessarily be designed in a manner
that would optimize all these functions. They are clearly not required to
maximize memorability, for instance, or learning in the same sense as
learning a language or a preferred behavior, which are classical subjects of
cognitive studies. 242 Rather, they should be easily understood, and
understood in a universal and unified manner. It may not be complicated to
write examples that are universally easier to understand than the substantive
language of the regulations, yet, it is much more difficult to present
examples that would be identically understood by all. This is particularly
true because the mere presentation of an example changes one's perspective
about the norm in the regulation since it provides ample detailed facts to
which the user relates, through availability, for instance. These insights
naturally have an impact on the proper interpretation of examples, and of
regulations more generally, and therefore the first step in the analysis is to
understand them, understand how humans read examples.
1. How Do Humans Read Examples? 243
Human minds operate in efficiency maximizing manners. We cannot
and do not stop to think through every step we take and every problem
presented to us in our daily affairs. We therefore often think "fast."2 44 Such
240 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 490 (arguing for a similar approach in a more
general administrative law context, noting both the utility of incorporating insights from
psychology and the need for caution in the implementation of conclusions drawn from such
studies).
241 Future study of the way we read and use law and regulations may shed further light
on the issues exposed by this article. In the absence of direct study of these particular
circumstances (a study which parameters may be very difficult to establish), this article
proceeds based on currently available knowledge.
242 See, e.g., EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 116.
243 This section, as well as the entire application of insights from cognition studies, is
highly simplified and limited for the purposes of this article: to note the desirability of a
more informed writing of regulatory examples. A comprehensive study of how humans read
law is beyond the scope of this article.
244 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 20-22.
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fast thinking also triggers inherent heuristics and biases that affect our
thinking in various relevant manners. 245
The availability heuristic noted above246 directs us (humans) in making
judgments and decisions based on the ease with which certain instances
come to mind. Therefore, we might think, for example, that certain events
are more probable the more we have been exposed to them, in terms of
either frequency or impact. 247 A realistic example, therefore, at least shifts
the focus of a reader of regulations from a comprehensive analysis of the
prescribed norm and all the possibilities it presents to the application of the
norm to a particular set of facts articulated in the example. The example is
attractive because it is easier to read than the regulatory language, it gives
the reader the comforting feeling (whether true or false) that she
understands the norm, and it is likely to make any analogy to the facts of
the relevant legal case much simpler. The appeal of an easier to read
example is intuitive, similar to the simple writing of norms in general.248
Yet, it is the availability heuristic that is especially powerful and
important for the purposes of this article. It may be argued that an expert tax
lawyer, who is the probable user of examples, is likely to be less affected by
the mere ease of reading examples in preference to the regulatory language.
An expert, however, consciously focuses on examples for specific reasons:
the professional reflex (and responsibility) to analogize the example with
the particular set of facts of the case at hand. What is not usually
acknowledged is the additional effect of the availability heuristic in this
context: the shift of attention from the general and abstract norm in the
regulatory language to the example and its features that most easily come to
mind. Take for instance the coffee example. 249 A tax lawyer who faces a
client who wishes to provide healthy snacks to her employees could engage
in a comprehensive interpretation of the regulatory language; yet, she is
much more likely to summarily advise the client that such provision may
trigger income to the client's employees, or to ask the client why would she
not just provide healthier coffee and similar snacks rather than take
unnecessary risks. An insistent client may of course obtain a memorandum
guiding her on how to reduce the risk of income inclusion if she were to
provide healthy snacks to her employees, yet that would cost her much
more than the supply of even the most expensive coffee and doughnuts.
245 Id.
246 See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text.
247 The research of the availability heuristic has focused on its effect on probabilistic
decision-making, which the heuristic negatively impacts. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note
145, at 12-13.
248 See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text (discussing the plain writing
movement and its achievements).
249 See supra Introduction.
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This cannot be the outcome that the government was trying to promote.
A similar process occurs pursuant to the so-called representativeness
heuristic that affects human decisions about events based on their similarity
to a representative population of events. 250 We are therefore predisposed to
pay attention to and make decisions based on the most salient properties of
a population of events. Returning to the coffee example, 251 it was clearly
written in the way it was because a great majority of employers actually
provided employees with various combinations of coffee, doughnuts, and
soft drinks. The author of the example had not likely considered the
contribution that the example itself would have to the salience of these
particular snacks and to their ubiquity.
These heuristics are used to explain behavior that deviates from what
some would call rational behavior.252 Notably such deviation is expected
from time to time as a natural consequence of a normal, imperfect human
decision-making pattern.253 Our unreserved acceptance of examples,
however, ignores the potentially negative impact of such thinking on our
interpretation of the unlearned and unguided writing of regulatory
examples. The negative impact may be due to over-restrictiveness of
regulations or to the ambiguity of the purpose or scope of the prescribed
norm. Fast thinking further exacerbates this lack of clarity.
Another often-studied heuristic, known as anchoring, is also relevant in
this context because it is often present when line drawing is required.254
Since line drawing is often required in tax regulations, anchoring plays a
major role in the introduction of biases to tax law. 255 For example, the
continuity-of-interest example provides the 40 percent anchor.256 For good
or for ill, this anchor affects the extent of risk taxpayers are willing to take
in their tax planning. They are trying to get their continuity as close as
possible to that number, even though there may be good law to support
250 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 84 (Daniel
Kahneman, et al. eds., 1982).
251 See supra Introduction.
252 Rational behavior maximizes the utility of one's actions. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK,
THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY (1993). It naturally is not impacted by the heuristics and
biases described above. Recent academic discourse prefers to use bounded rationality, i.e.,
rationality bounded by limitations such as heuristics, to describe actual human thinking and
behavior. The term "bounded rationality" is attributed to HENRY A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN
(1957).
253 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 145.
254 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 119-28. For more on line drawing in tax
law, see, e.g., supra note 171.
255 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 145, at 119-28 (providing examples of bias
introduced by anchoring); supra notes 195-197 and the accompanying text.
256 See supra Part II.B.
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more or less aggressive positions. It is clearly the mentioned percentage -
the anchor - that gets most, if not all, of the focus rather than the norm
prescribed by the regulatory language. It is also clear that the choice of this
anchor had not been made intentionally, after careful assessment of its
impact and alternative measures. We know this for a fact because the 40
percent anchor reflected a particular set of facts in a single case that
eventually became precedential.2 57
Other, nonline drawing specificity examples also introduce anchoring.
The coffee example anchors what is to be considered de minimis for
purposes of the fringe benefits rules with regard to the price of the
mentioned snacks. 258 The effect of anchoring is different from that of the
availability or the representativeness heuristics. 259 The example anchors de
minimis snacks to the price of typical workplace coffees, doughnuts, and
soft drinks. Consequently, a health-conscious employer that provides her
employees with herbal tea, health bars, and fresh-squeezed juice (all
organic, of course), is likely to face an issue if these snacks typically cost
over three times more than the ubiquitous coffee, doughnuts, and soft
drinks. This is the case because healthy snacks are not mentioned
specifically in the example, are not as ubiquitous as those mentioned, and
there is a price difference between healthy snacks and those snacks that
have been chosen as the standard by the regulation author. Note that the
cost of healthy snacks would not necessarily fail the low-cost-to-the-
employer test of the regulatory language if it were not for the example that
anchors what is to be considered de minimis to the cheapest, most
ubiquitous workplace snacks. Finally, note that the examples themselves,
when added to the regulatory language, may serve as anchors. The
examples shift the focus from the independent interpretation of the
regulatory language and instead anchor the process to whatever is
described: a line drawn, a representative circumstance, etc. This effect is
particularly powerful in the transfer pricing context, since, as mentioned,
the arm's length standard requires comparability of market transactions to
nonmarket transactions.2 60  Under this standard every comparable
transaction serves as an anchor, and a transaction that comes through an
example that hints to where one should look for comparable transactions
and what the standard for comparability would be, is naturally even more
powerful.
257 See supra note 48.
258 See supra Introduction.
259 See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr & Doron Teichman, Anchoring Legal
Standards, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 298 (2016) (explaining the effect of anchoring by
the law itself, including examples of anchoring by examples provided by the law in a tort
context similar to the regulatory examples discussed in this article).
260 See supra Part II.C.
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A comprehensive review of the effects of heuristics and biases on the
reading of regulatory examples is obviously beyond the scope of this
article, yet two additional insights are essential to fully comprehend the
importance of being mindful of these biases when thinking about examples
in tax regulations. First, the effect of framing may be very dramatic in the
writing of tax regulations. 26 1 Framing was originally studied in the context
of loss aversion, demonstrating that humans react differently to
circumstances that involve winning and losing, despite an identity of the
real economic consequences of these circumstances. 2 62 It is easy to
understand that taxpayers would react differently to examples that describe
permissible circumstances (safe harbors) in comparison to those describing
bad tax consequences (sure shipwrecks). The software regulation examples
mentioned above serve as a good illustration of this issue, notably providing
a roadmap for taxpayers that does not necessarily fit the purpose of the
regulatory language.2 63 Similarly, the transfer pricmig example, being
permissive - even if with respect to unrealistic circumstances - is
understandably interpreted very broadly, and taxpayers enjoy its permissive
nature.2 64 A differently framed example, one that would compare two
countries with 50 percent differences in GDP per capita, for instance, and
that would declare such countries noncomparable for transfer pricing
purposes, would likely eliminate essentially all of the potential use of arm's
length for transfer pricing comparability. The difference in framing may
therefore be dramatic. Note also that the choice to frame examples in one
way or the other is left completely at the discretion of the regulation author.
There is also no particular balancing of positive and negative examples.
This article contends that it is unthinkable to expect single regulation
authors to systematically make decisions about inclusion of regulatory
examples based on framing (and other) effects.
Finally, Tversky and Kahneman developed what they called the
"prospect theory" of human behavior, arguing - in conflict with rational
choice theory that dominated classic law and economics literature - that
people evaluate outcomes against an initial reference point and not based on
the outcome itself.265 Therefore, what matters most is often the change from
261 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (discussing how framing produces shifts
in preference).
262 See id.; STEFAN TRAUB, FRAMING EFFECTS IN TAXATION (1999) (providing a
relatively recent study of the effects of framing in taxation).
263 See supra Part IV.A.2.
264 See supra Part I.C.
265 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 (1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel
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a current or perceived state of things. This theory also explains loss
aversion, the known endowment effect, etc. 266 For the purposes of this
article it is important to understand, again, that people do not read examples
in a void, but rather against their own experiences, and usually they have to
implement a rule and use the example to interpret it from a given tax
position. They will therefore identify the positive similarities or focus on
the negative distinctive features of an example rather than on what it says in
isolation about the regulatory language. This, of course, is not unique to tax
law or to regulatory examples, yet, the research conducted for this article
exposes a complete lack of attention to prospect theory, as regulation
authors apparently seek to produce clear, general norms based on the
assumption that users of regulations are rational, all-knowing and they do
not tax plan around the rules in the regulations. Proper training or even
basic guidance could improve the perspective of such authors and help them
draft more effectively. Next, the article elaborates on what is needed to
achieve this goal.
2. Better Informed Drafting of Examples
Can we improve the writing of regulations to rationalize the use of
regulatory examples and make them more effective? The starting point must
be understanding that some norms are too difficult to write generally and
abstractly and hence require fine-tuning with regulatory examples. It should
also be clear that the discretion granted to regulation authors cannot be
unlimited, especially when they likely receive little to no training or
guidance on how to apply such discretion. This article argues that
regulatory examples, even when routinely added,267 are not objectionable
per se, yet their use should be informed and subject to guidance and
restraint. 268 A better-informed approach to the drafting of examples would
take into account biases that are inherent to human thinking, using
methodologies to ameliorate their undesirable impact.269
The first conclusion must be that the purpose of an added example
Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992).
266 Id.
267 Routines in government agency practice could be beneficial for the preservation of
institutional knowledge, for example. This article argues these benefits will be better
captured when routines are not merely arbitrary, but when they are regularly examined and
practiced according to explicit guidance that ensure accountability and focus. See, e.g.,
Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 493.
268 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 7, for previous calls for regulatory restraint.
269 As one would do in her private life in order to overcome her biases. See, e.g.,
KAHNEMAN, supra note 145.
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should be present and clear. Clear guidance and rules on how to interpret
the examples could satisfy this conclusion with relative ease. Authors of
regulations may be required to add an explanatory note to the preamble of
the regulations about the purpose of the examples added.2 70 Alternatively,
they may add language that would clarify the examples' purpose. For
instance, the words "merely for illustration of the rule in . . ." or "to
illustrate the formula prescribed. . ." may be added to examples that
illustrate an element in the regulatory language. These additions may be
required as part of simple guidance to regulation authors. Such
clarifications would be easier to implement if the government clarified that
examples are generally subject to the regulatory language to settle the
confusion in practice and in the courts. The requirement of a clear, explicit
purpose would likely eliminate those examples that do not have a purpose
and would also likely eliminate examples that are unrealistic or do not add
anything to the regulatory language. At the minimum, this requirement will
force authors to pause and think more deeply about the consequences of
adding regulatory examples.
The legal status clarification would help the examples that seem to
reshape the contours of the rules, such as in the Parks case.271
Accompanying guidance should alert authors of regulations to the difficulty
presented by examples that go beyond reasonable interpretations of the
regulatory language present. Such guidance may also advise rewriting the
regulatory language in cases of doubt.
Explicit guidance should also deal with the problematic targeting
practice. The government will likely be reluctant to limit itself in this
regard, yet it is difficult to find a valid reason for targeting through
regulatory examples rather than through rulings. Written guidance would
have to settle the issue one way or the other. Note that even nudging
requires transparency and a choice element.272
Finally, heuristics and biases, such as anchoring, framing, availability,
and representativeness explained above require training and some
sophistication to spot and effectively tackle. In the context of regulatory
examples, authors of regulations would be best served if they were properly
trained in heuristics and biases so they could better identify the actual
270 For a more general analysis of the importance and utility of preambles for regulatory
interpretation, see Kevin M. Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252
(2016) (explaining that preambles are a ubiquitous, authoritative, and important source of
guidance, yet one that has been largely unmentioned in the debates over agency reliance on
guidance and arguing that the preamble has a dual role of justification of the regulations and
guidance as to their interpretation). This article agrees and argues that preambles similarly
could be used to support better understanding of examples in tax regulations.
271 See Parks v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 278 (2015).
272 See THALER & SLJNSTE[N, supra note 28, at 81-100.
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impact of their choices. A first important step is to provide them with clear
explanations of heuristics and biases and their potential impact on the use of
regulations. This should be done with illustrations, such as those provided
by this article, so that the authors are at least aware of potential downfalls.
Awareness of heuristics and biases is key to every remedial step, and should
not be difficult once the government agrees to provide guidance on the
writing of regulatory examples.
Next, the article demonstrates how regulation authors could implement
awareness to the various challenges, including the cognitive biases,
mentioned above, and when the authors should use regulatory examples.
V. A FEW CHALLENGING CATEGORIES OF EXAMPLES AND THEIR
APPROPRIATE USE IN REGULATIONS
Regulatory examples are flawed even when their purpose is clear.
About 90 percent of the survey's expert participants found deficiencies in
the actual drafting of examples. 273 This part elaborates on these deficiencies
and their sources. It does not attempt to present a comprehensive report or a
complete and optimally detailed categorization of regulatory examples, it
merely discusses the most common and most conspicuous categories arising
from the survey and the research performed for this article to illustrate the
difficulties presented by the unguided use of regulatory examples.
A. Examples That Add Little to the Regulation
A large number of examples add little or nothing in terms of guidance
to the regulatory language. These examples simply restate the words of the
regulation in an example format, or describe unrealistic or rarely realistic
cases, or describe cases that are too simple - so simple that their
presentation effectively adds nothing to the language of the regulation. Take
Treasury Regulation section 1.132-2(c) for instance, which includes the sole
example provided in a fringe benefits regulation (and is different from the
coffee example mentioned above) (hereafter the no-additional-cost
example).2 74 This example explains that the value of services provided to an
employee by an employer at no (significant) additional cost does not have
to be included in income by the employee. 275 The regulatory language
clarifies that whatever is regularly sold to customers may be provided to an
employee if such provision does not burden the employer with significant
extra costs. 276 A key element for noninclusion is that the employer does not
273 See supra note 22.
274 Tres. Reg. § 1.132-2(c) (1989).
275 id.
276 Id. § 1.132-2(a)(1).
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forgo revenue by providing the service to the employee. 277 Moreover, the
regulation specifically provides "(s)ervices that are eligible for treatment as
no-additional-cost services include excess capacity services such as hotel
accommodations; transportation by aircraft, train, bus, subway, or cruise
line; and telephone services." 2 78 The sole example included in this
regulation follows, reading: "Assume that a commercial airline permits its
employees to take personal flights on the airline at no charge and receive
reserved seating. Because the employer forgoes potential revenue by
permitting the employees to reserve seats, employees receiving such free
flights are not eligible for the no-additional-cost exclusion." 279
The example merely illustrates the most expected scenario under this
regulation, and one that is fully covered by explicit regulatory language,
including specificity (the mention of air tickets). The example simply
repeats the regulatory language in a different format, a narrative, and adds
nothing to the norm. It also demonstrates the problem that expectations of
examples create. The author clearly met these expectations with little
analysis of its implications. She was also probably affected by availability,
since complimentary air tickets are likely the most salient among the
transactions that the regulatory rule tries to prevent (the representative bias
and anchoring are at work here too). One may argue the example is merely
redundant, but not harmful. However, as already argued, no example is
completely unbiased. Although reasonable interpretation must lead one to
the conclusion that the example adds nothing to the regulatory language, it
could also be read in a manner that would circumvent its purpose - as
prohibitive only of relatively high-ticket items such as air tickets, for
instance.
The transfer pricing example is another good example for the
application of a concept - the arm's length standard - to a structured fact
pattern.2 80 The simple goal of the example, as mentioned, was to
demonstrate the application of the rule (the CUT method using internal
comparables) as derived from the arm's length standard.2 81 Yet, in an
attempt to create a perfect basic regulatory example, the author of the
regulations drafted a completely unrealistic fact pattern, adding nothing in
terms of guidance to the regulatory language. 282 Yet again, the consequence
of an unrealistic example is not mere nonimpact. One could infer from the
example, for instance, that only perfect comparability permits the
277 Id.
278 Id. § 1.132-2(a)(2).
279 Id. § 1.132-2(c).
280 See supra Part II.C.
281 See supra Part II.C.
282 See supra Part II.C.
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application of CUT, which could not have been the intent of the author of
the regulations. There are multiple ways to interpret this example, basically
making it useful for essentially every reasonable argument a taxpayer (or a
government) wishes to make, and hence the example is worse than useless
- it is harmful. This example, which is like many or most of the examples
in the regulations under Code section 482, fail because they avoid the
difficult cases with which the general arm's length rules struggle - the
cases where examples could be useful. Instead, these examples focus on
sanitized, "laboratory" fact patterns that a prudent lawyer should easily
analyze correctly based on the regulatory language alone, yet another
lawyer devoted to her clients (or to the government) could interpret
differently. The examples only complicate matters, as they distract from the
prescribed norms, as evidenced by the survey discussed in this article. The
survey asked the participants to mention a single example they "love" or
"hate," and the transfer pricing regulations were mentioned more frequently
than any others in the "hate" category, by almost a quarter of the
participants. 283 Since most of the participants are unlikely to be
international tax law experts (the survey covered experts from multiple sub-
fields of tax law), this data must mean that most international tax experts
view these regulations as the most poorly drafted in terms of example
writing in this field.
B. Examples That Limit or Expand the Scope of the Regulation
Another issue resides with regulatory examples that define the scope of
the norm they support, a controversial practice in terms of purpose as
already explained. Such examples present significant design challenges.
This article analyzed two good instances of regulatory examples that shape
the contours of regulations beyond the regulatory language. 28 4 First, the
Parks case provides an example of regulatory language pursuant to Code
section 4945 in which an advertisement that "refers to" ballot measures
leads to an excise tax, but it does not explain the level of reference
required.28 5 An example follows that states this term encompasses reference
to messages using language "widely used" or "identified with" specific
legislation to expand the prohibition.2 86 This means that direct reference to
ballot measures is not needed for an effective prohibition of advertisements
of the kind analyzed by the Parks Court. The Court indeed followed the
example and did not engage in general interpretation of the regulatory
283 See supra note 22.
284 See supra Part IV.A.3.
285 See supra Part IV.A.3.
286 See supra Part IV.A.3.
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language beyond it. This case raises many interesting questions, yet the first
contribution it makes to the analysis in this article is that it confirms the
importance of examples in the practice of tax law, and demonstrates that it
would be unrealistic to expect tax experts always to approach the examples
against a complete and balanced interpretation of the regulatory language
that they accompany. A second question that this case raises is why the
author of the regulations did not simply include the precise, expansive,
language that she viewed as correct in the regulatory language. To have
included precise language seems simple enough in this case. Any
interpretation of this decision beyond a lack of thinking about the
consequences of the drafting routine would be very unflattering.
The second example of the same category is found in Treasury
Regulation section 1.1275-5(d), Example 5, also mentioned above.2 87 The
example denies favorable treatment to debt instruments linked to the S&P
500 index, even though such treatment is generally granted to debt
instruments linked to "objective rates" that are beyond the control of the
relevant taxpayer (and hence, presumably do not present a risk of abuse).2 88
The example simply assumes based on historical data that the index always
increases in value, resulting in a significantly "back-loaded" instrument -
an assumption that is false and diverts from the seemingly obvious focus of
the norm, which is to deny certain debt instruments such beneficial tax
treatment because they are deemed abusive as they could easily be tailored
by taxpayers to meet the basic VRDI requirements. 28 9 The example
therefore limits the scope of the VRDI rule, yet with no explanation, and
does so in contradiction to the regulatory language. In this case the example
was clearly not routinely added; the author of the regulations simply wanted
to disadvantage index linked debt, or, maybe, limit the scope of VRDI
based on objective rates. Yet, again, it is difficult to see why the author has
not utilized different, more restrictive regulatory language in that case.
Finally, many examples provide numerical thresholds, such as the one
mentioned above in the continuity-of-interest example. 290 Some of these are
very helpful as illustrations of otherwise difficult to apply norms, yet others
expand or limit the scope of norms in manners that may be inappropriate or
undesirable, as explained above in the discussion of anchoring 29 1 and the
continuity-of-interest example. 2 92
287 See supra Part IV.A.3.
288 See supra Part IV.A.3.
289 See supra Part IV.A.3.
290 See supra Part II.B.
291 See supra Part IV.B.1.
292 See supra Part II.B.
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C. Examples That Blur the Scope or Aim of the Regulation or the Law (or
Contradict Them)
According to the survey discussed in this article, other unfavorable
examples include those that contradict the regulatory language or contradict
other examples. Such examples come up in a variety of scenarios. Some
simply refer to old law and were overlooked in the revision process; some
are honest drafting mistakes; and some are likely the result of unclear
statutory or regulatory norms that could not be remedied, despite the
common effort by regulation authors to do so.
Unrealistic examples, such as the transfer pricing example mentioned
above, generally obscure the scope and aim of regulations.29 3 Yet, when the
examples contradict the regulatory language, they are always
counterproductive. A good example of this is an illustration of the treatment
of mixed business and personal travel expenses. Treasury Regulations
section 1.162-2(b)(2) provides: "Whether a trip is related primarily to the
taxpayer's trade or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on
the facts and circumstances in each case." 294 Yet, it is illustrated with an
example of a taxpayer who travels for six weeks, spending the first week on
activities related to her trade or business and the following five weeks on
vacation. 295 An identical example appears in Treasury Regulations section
1.162-5(e) in the context of educational expenses, where the taxpayer
spends the first week attending a tax course and the rest of the six weeks on
vacation. 296 It is obvious that the author of the regulations wished to clearly
illustrate that the taxpayer in these examples had vacation as her primary
purpose of the tested trip. However, at the same time, the examples use
durations that are rare in the United States where few employees are able to
spend six weeks away from work, including five of them on vacation.
Further, this very situation is discussed in Treasury Regulations section
1.274-4, which disallows certain expenses for mixed personal and business
foreign travel expenses. 29 7 Although this regulation focuses on foreign
travel, there is no material difference in the applicable norm. The examples
in Treasury Regulations section 1.274-4(g) are much more realistic than
those mentioned above, using a maximum vacation period of two weeks,
and, applying a different norm: the vacation portion cannot exceed 25
percent of the total time of the foreign travel when travel is beyond one
week - a test that is very different from the facts and circumstances test
293 See supra Part II.C.
294 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2) (1993).
295 id.
296 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e), ex. 2 (1967).
297 Treas. Reg. § 1.274-4 (1964).
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mentioned in the other regulations. 298 It is not difficult to observe the
inconsistencies within these regulations and the contribution of the
examples to the lack of clarity in what should be a straightforward matter.
Moreover, although the Service learns from its drafting mistakes, as
demonstrated next, one cannot argue that flawed drafting typifies only older
regulations; this case, for instance, the better drafting predates the less
realistic examples.
As mentioned, the Service has attempted from time to time to revise
regulations to fix inconsistencies, 299 yet usually these revisions become
long overdue before they are made. 300 For instance, the 2015 final Code
section 851 regulations 301 revised the examples that illustrate how the
controlled group rules applicable to regulated investment companies (RICs)
affect the RIC asset diversification requirements. Code section 851 provides
these requirements, including a 25 percent test.302 When ascertaining the
value of a taxpayer's investment in the securities of an issuer, in order to
determine whether the 25 percent tests have been met, a taxpayer's
proportionate part of any investment in the securities of the issuer that are
held by a member of the taxpayer's controlled group, must be aggregated
with the taxpayer's investment in the issuer.303 The old examples, as well as
the 1942 legislative history, led taxpayers to interpret Code section
851(c)(3) as requiring two levels of controlled entities in order for a
controlled group to exist. The final regulation's new examples now clarify
that two corporations are sufficient to constitute a controlled group so long
as the ownership requirements of section 851 (c)(3) are met. 30
Another example of contradictory examples can be found in the
software regulations of Treasury Regulations section 1.861_18.305 As
298 Id.
299 The Service engages in natural internal control processes, such as comments from
field agents about rule making. These controls, however, are not structural but instead are
arbitrary; thus they are only effective, if at all, late in the process. See, e.g., Roy A. Nixon,
IRS Employee Recommends Clarifying Language in Repair Regs. (Section 263 - Capital
Expenditures) 2012 TNT 33-31 (Feb. 17, 2012) (commenting on contradictory examples in
proposed regulations discussing betterments in building (roof improvements, etc.)).
3 See also Richard Dees, Possible New Regulations under Internal Revenue Code
Section 2704(b), 179 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) (Sept. 16, 2015) (providing examples of actual
and desired changes to regulatory examples in a regulation project under 2704(b)).
301 T.D. 9737, 2015-40 I.R.B. 449.
302 I.R.C. § 85 1(b).
303 Id.
304 For a discussion of the regulations, the rewriting of the examples, and the former
confusion and contradictions caused by the old examples, see, e.g., William R. Davis, IRS
Addresses Mutual Fund Asset Diversification Rules, 148 TAx NOTEs 1302 (Sept. 21, 2015).
Note that the amendment took almost sixty years.
305 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18 (1998).
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explained above, these important regulations attempt to regulate the
characterization of software transactions that have presented very difficult
cases for taxpayers and tax authorities worldwide. 306 The regulations are
impactful, but the content is not always intellectually defensible. Some
examples are difficult to understand, and, even more importantly, some
examples defy the purpose of the regulations - usually by presenting a
roadmap for taxpayers to achieve their desired tax consequences. This could
not have been the intent of the regulations' authors. Note that this article
has no quarrel with the decision to include regulatory examples in the
software regulations. The regulatory norm prescribed an algorithm for
characterizing software transactions, and it was appropriate to use examples
to illustrate the application of such an algorithm. Moreover, the scenarios
described by the software regulations were quite relevant to the industry
regulated.307 The problem was in the choice of the detailed examples and
their analysis, and especially the combination of Examples 8, 9, and 10,
which cannot be fully reconciled with each other but effectively incentivize
taxpayers to restructure transactions wastefully to avoid United States
taxation based on a roadmap that would not have been easily inferred from
the regulatory language but is recklessly articulated by the examples. 308
There are several hundred examples in the regulations, and therefore
the comprehensive analysis of each of them is beyond the scope of this
article. The article merely points to a few salient examples of flaws in the
use of examples in order to advocate a better-informed process for their
drafting. Next, the article provides a preliminary modest proposal on how to
begin this process.
VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL
The most basic prescription for better-informed regulatory example
writing includes explicit guidance to drafters on why, when, and how to
include regulatory examples. 309 It should further encourage mindfulness of
306 See supra Part IV.A.2.
307 See supra note 178.
308 The VRDI example analyzed in the Part III.A.3 suffers from the same issues.
309 Note that in the more general context of administrative guidance there is a discourse
over the desirable review process. Elizabeth Magill advocated that courts demand that
agencies explain their choices of procedural modes, not just in the context of guidance
documents. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policy Making Form, 71 U. CHi. L. REv.
1383, 1412-15 (2004). Mark Seidenfeld preferred ex-post judicial review to explanations
and other suggestions because he thought it would be difficult for stakeholders to obtain
review if even perfunctory explanation were provided. Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting
Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEx. L. REv. 331, 334, 373-
94(2011). He also argued that the need to explain would likely mire down the agency and
thereby significantly discourage appropriate use of guidance documents. Id. at 374-75.
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the impact of cognitive processes, including biases, on the effectiveness of
such examples, resulting in improved accountability. This section provides
a modest proposal on how to initiate this process conservatively.
A. Explicit Drafting Guidance
The first, and most important, proposal of this article is that the
Treasury Department provide regulation authors with explicit guidance on
the drafting of regulatory examples. The drafting proposed below is derived
from the insights of this article.
1. Clientele
First, the guidance should establish a standard for drafters to follow
with respect to the target audience of examples. The article proposes to
clarify that examples are written primarily for the benefit of tax experts, yet
they should be balanced in terms of generality to accommodate the average,
capable tax expert.
2. Purpose
The article further recommends that the purpose of regulatory
examples should be stated explicitly and clearly. The guidelines could
satisfy this requirement with relative ease, by requiring such language to be
added to the preamble of the regulations. Alternatively, the guidelines
should require additional regulatory language that would clarify the
examples' purpose. For instance, the words "merely for illustration of the
rule in. . ." or "to illustrate the formula prescribed. . ." may precede
examples that merely illustrate an element in the regulatory language. It
would be desirable to advise authors to avoid including examples that add
nothing to the regulatory language, or describe trivial or unrealistic fact
patterns.
Such clarifications would be easier to implement if interpretation rules
were also adopted. Most importantly, the government could clarify that
examples are generally subject to the regulatory language to settle the
Finally, he thought that courts would be unlikely to impose sufficiently stringent review to
deter or correct agency misuse of guidance. Id. at 374. Seidenfeld's is an important criticism,
yet even if it is valid more generally, it cannot negate the need for guidance on regulatory
examples. Judicial review of Service action when based on regulations is minimal, and is
essentially nonexistent when examples are concerned. Further, it is difficult to see how a
mere call for more review would trigger effective review in practice. The argument that the
government is shy to furnish guidance due to the need to explain itself is also not very
convincing in this context, since this is exactly the point of this article as supported by the
survey.
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confusion in tax practice and in the courts over this matter. The
interpretation rules may also settle potential controversies created by
examples described in this article as reshaping the contours of the rules,
such as the example featured in the Parks case.310 The guidance should
alert the authors of regulations to the difficulty presented by examples that
go beyond reasonable interpretations of regulatory language. Such guidance
may also advise rewriting the regulatory language in cases of doubt.
Finally, the issue of targeting should be addressed. The government
would likely be reluctant to limit itself in this regard, yet it is difficult to
find a valid reason for targeting not to be shifted back from regulations to
rulings.
3. Drafting
Even when a clear and permissible purpose for including an example in
a regulation is acknowledged, the regulation's author should ask herself
whether the addition of the example is necessary. Perhaps rewriting the
regulatory language or the relegation of the narrative to another type of
Service proclamation, such as a ruling, would be more appropriate.
Examples are currently embedded in the regulatory language, or
separated, often under a separate heading: "examples." The drafting
guidance should alert the author of regulations to the benefits of each
method. If the recommendation to embed examples in the regulatory
language is adopted, it should be used in cases where elaboration is
required, such as a closed list of items, or, more specifically, in the case of
the no-additional-cost services example noted above.311 Otherwise,
examples should be separated from the regulatory language, preferably with
additional language that clarifies their purpose as recommended above.
The use of examples to illustrate methodologies, formulae, and the like,
such as in the case of the section 1060 example, noted above, 312 should be
encouraged, since these are difficult to understand using the abstract
regulatory language alone. The guidance should, however, alert regulation
authors to use additional caution when they contemplate the addition of
other types of specificity examples. General regulatory examples, such as
those where the author of a regulation believes an illustration of a
prescribed norm is useful, are inherently vulnerable to the impact of
cognitive biases. The coffee example is used throughout this article to
demonstrate this vulnerability. 313 The interpretation rules mentioned above
310 Parks v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 278 (2015). See supra Part IV.A.3.
311 See supra Part V.A.
312 See supra Part II.C.; supra Part IV.A.1.
313 See supra Introduction.
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go a long way toward fixing it, yet they are not sufficient. The guidance
should alert regulation authors to the impact of heuristics, such as
anchoring, framing, availability, and representativeness.
Beyond alert, better understanding of cognitive biases could assist the
government to nudge taxpayers (in the Thaler & Sunstein sense3 14) to
respond in certain, desirable ways. One may argue whether such practice
would be appropriate, yet this article prefers to remain agnostic on this
question. Nevertheless, the article proposes that the guidance include
specific terms for such use, such as the requirement for provisions to be
clear and unambiguous, reflecting the purpose of the prescribed rule. For
example, if targeting were considered appropriate and regulation authors
chose to use an example for this purpose, they should clarify in the example
the decisive offensive act, and why such a transaction has been targeted.
The regulation's authors should be cautioned to consider conflicts between
the regulatory language and the targeting example, such as in the case of the
VRDI example. 3 15 They should also be cautioned to consider the breadth of
such targeting when administered through regulations, albeit in examples.
Finally, the guidance should prescribe a procedure for avoiding
conflicts among examples in the same and in different regulations - a
procedure that could resolve the inconsistencies found in the mixed work
and vacation examples discussed above.3 16
4. Revisions
Examples, like other rules, may become obsolete. In general, the public
comments assist the government in spotting obsolete examples or examples
that become conflicting due to new rules or examples. 317 The drafting
guidance should include a statement to this effect.
B. Education: Mindfulness About Cognitive Biases
Cognitive bias, as explained, is difficult to overcome since it is part of
normal human cognition. Yet, because bias is systematic, it is possible to
predict and sometimes counter it; mindfulness about bias is helpful in
ameliorating its potentially undesirable impact.3 18 Therefore, this article
proposes that the drafting guidance include relevant, basic information
about heuristics and biases in order to alert regulations' authors to their
314 See supra note 28.
315 See supra Part IV.A.3.
316 See supra Part V.C.
317 See, e.g., supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text. Note the long time it took for
the government to revise the regulatory examples under I.R.C. § 851. Id.
318 See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 145.
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potential harm. Cognitive biases could be used intentionally to strengthen a
point or to nudge taxpayers. Educating authors in this field would result in
better-informed regulation drafting.
C. Implications for Regulatory Interpretation
Legal scholarship about regulatory interpretation is in its infancy. The
rise of the regulatory state requires a theory of interpretation of regulations,
yet, despite the acknowledged differences between statutes and regulations,
most of the relevant scholarship has drawn upon the extensive and time-
honored work on statutory interpretation. 3 19 This scholarship promoted
ideas such as literary, 320 purposive, 32 1 and intent-based interpretation of
regulations,322 none of which achieved much prominence. It is not
surprising then that a general interpretation theory for regulatory examples
has yet to emerge. The complete lack of reference to the difficulties
inherent in interpreting the regulatory examples present is, however, more
surprising. As already mentioned, one would expect the courts at the very
least to have taken an explicit position on the matter. Yet, as demonstrated
in Part I, the courts, in similar form to the rest of the tax bar, have crudely
avoided it.323 In response, a recent article by Morse and Osofsky introduced
a new theory for interpretation of examples that generally calls for a
common law, analogy-based reasoning to uncover the law inherent in the
regulatory scheme. 324 They view regulatory examples as nmni-cases m
support of the regulatory language. 325 The purpose of this article is not to
present a competing interpretation theory to that of Morse and Osofsky,
319 See, e.g., Frank C. Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REv.
509 (1947) (noting the similarity of regulations and statutes, yet arguing that their
differences should give rise to a separate study of appropriate regulatory interpretation); Lars
Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a "Legislative History" of Agency Rules,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2000) (pointing to the practice of similar interpretation of statutes and
regulations and arguing that courts should give more weight to the original drafting intent of
the relevant agencies); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REv. 355
(2012) (stating additional differences between statutes and regulations, leading to the
conclusion that different interpretation theories are required); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial
Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 681 (1984)
(reviewing regulatory interpretation approaches by different courts).
320 See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81 (2015) (emphasizes
the careful negotiation and drafting of regulations, further suggesting a variety of sources,
with a determination of hierarchy, to assist in the proposed textual interpretation of
regulations).
321 See, e.g., Stack, supra note 319.
322 See Noah, supra note 319.
323 See supra Part 1I.B.
324 Morse & Osofsky, supra note 14.
325 Morse & Osofsky, supra note 14.
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since they develop their theory on the basis of the existing legal scheme.
The article instead focuses on the existing legal scheme, its flaws, the
reasons for such flaws, and recommendations for reform. The analysis
presented by this article does, however, give rise to a few comments
regarding the interpretation that should not be ignored.
The first, and most obvious point, relates to the status of examples vis-
A-vis the regulatory language. Morse and Osofsky view the examples as
part of, and equal ("co-equal" in their terms) to the regulatory language. 326
This approach is technically reasonable and legally quite standard. As
mentioned, the "co-equal" approach was used with no further discussion by
some courts. 327 Yet, it contrasts with the other approaches adopted by some
courts and many practitioners that subject examples to the regulatory
language. Morse and Osofsky's approach also ignores the language that
often accompanies examples: the word "example" itself, the word
"illustrates," and the term "could be illustrated" etc. This article prefers the
latter approach, contrary to Morse and Osofsky, and, further, advocates the
adoption of an explicit regulatory rule that subjects examples to the
regulatory language. Such a rule would resolve many of the interpretation
ambiguities that examples present and would therefore eliminate the need
for complex interpretation endeavors. Moreover, the adoption of this rule
would not limit the government's regulatory power, which seems to be the
concern of Morse and Osofsky, but would instill discipline in the regulatory
drafting process by requiring more precise drafting. Consequently, the
interpretation rule proposed by this article is necessarily superior to the
current state of the law, even if it were well theorized in accordance with
Morse and Osofsky.
Secondly, this article's analysis of regulatory examples, their purposes
and the motivations surrounding their use lend to a few conclusions that are
relevant to the development of any regulatory interpretation theory. 328
Dominant textual interpretation of the examples in tax regulations raise
serious effectiveness concerns. Suffice it to mention the impact of the
cognitive biases mentioned by this article in contexts such as continuity-of-
interest,329 de minimis fringe benefits,3 30 and VRD1 3 31 to demonstrate that
even the most capable textual interpreter would face challenges in some
nonobvious cases, such as the status of expensive healthy snacks.
Moreover, if the text is not supported with clear articulations of the purpose
326 Morse & Osofsky, supra note 14.
327 Morse & Osofsky, supra note 14; supra Part II.B.
328 Yet, any conclusions beyond tax law are outside the scope of this article.
329 The continuity-of-interest example. See supra Part II.B.
330 The coffee example. See supra Introduction.
331 The VRDI example. See supra Part IV.A.3.
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of the examples as proposed by this article, there will continue to be very
few sources to assist in the accurate "purposive" interpretation of regulatory
examples. Intent based regulatory interpretation also raises serious
substantive and evidentiary concerns. Again, if the intent is manifested in
the explicit, stated purpose then it cannot be superior to purposive
interpretation, and if not, then intent based interpretation would likely lead
to the same confusion that examples are met with at present, as clearly
reflected by the survey and the analysis presented by this article. Finally,
purposive interpretation seems superior to the other regulatory
interpretation proposals, 'yet unless regulatory examples are accompanied
by an explicit, stated purpose, purposive interpretation would likely be
employed as it is at present: with confusion. The most immediate concern
about regulatory examples is not how to interpret them in the context of the
regulatory language, but to determine their role in the regulatory scheme.
Once such role is clear: interpretation would be significantly simplified.
D. Next Steps
This article is just the first step in the study of examples in tax
regulations. There are many more problematic examples that were noted by
survey participants yet were not analyzed by this article due to space
constraints. The analysis in this article consciously chose to draw on
examples from various areas of tax law. One cannot escape the conclusion
that the situation is quite similar regardless of the particular area discussed.
The analysis will surely benefit from further study of the different areas of
tax law to establish whether they deserve special guidance in this regard.
The behavioral analysis similarly could benefit from further study and
specific experimentation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examples in tax regulations are generally favored by all stakeholders.
The government encourages their ubiquitous use in the drafting of tax
regulations, and taxpayers, primarily through their expert tax advisers,
heavily rely on examples to navigate through the notoriously complex tax
rules. Despite the ubiquity of these examples, there is no published
guidance for their drafting, their use, or their interpretation. This article is
the first to question the rationale behind this common, unchallenged
practice and to argue for its regulation.
The article exposes the practice, first by classifying the types of
examples added to tax regulations. It does so to enable a better
understanding of the advantages and deficiencies in the current use of
regulatory examples. To this end, the article utilizes data collected from
original surveys of expert tax professionals and of government employees,
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who are (or were) involved in the drafting of tax regulations. The article
exposes the lack of clarity with regard to the intended clientele of regulatory
examples, and it concludes that the only likely users are expert tax
professionals. The article adds that even among experts there are significant
differences in the perceived target audience of regulatory examples, leading
it to recommend a drafting standard that would ensure that complexity
levels are set with the average capable tax expert in mind.
Beyond the clientele question, the article demonstrates the lack of
clarity regarding the appropriate purpose of regulatory examples. It
demonstrates that some examples are simply redundant and purposeless,
while others serve multiple purposes that may be difficult to identify.
Finally, the article raises the possibility that certain purposes are not
appropriate for regulatory examples, primarily discussing the targeting of
certain taxpayer actions or transactions through general regulations rather
than taxpayer specific rulings.
Despite these deficiencies, examples have a strong appeal for all
stakeholders. The article explains this appeal, its benefits and its potential
hazards, using insights from behavioral science and particularly from the
study of cognitive biases. It explains, for example, how anchoring via an
example, rather than regulatory language, could shift the focus of a
regulatory rule and alter the boundaries of the law in inappropriate or unfair
ways. The article further argues that cognitive biases affect both regulation
authors and users in less transparent and much less controllable manners
than realized.332 This analysis makes the point that a more careful and
better-informed process could improve the clarity and the precision of the
rules - goals that match the very reason for adding examples to regulations
in the first place.
Relying on this analysis, this article proposes a better-informed
approach to the drafting of regulatory examples. It focuses on the need for a
better-informed approach together with regulatory restraint.333 This
approach to the drafting of examples would take into account the biases that
are inherent to human thinking, and hence to the reading and use of
examples, and would design a methodology to ameliorate the undesirable
impact of such biases. 334 The proposed approach also emphasizes
332 Even when fully performed, monitoring of regulation projects is sub-optimal due to
the group work practice within the Treasury. Group work is both desirable, as it increases the
depth of expertise involved, and undesirable, as it may amplify biases of the kind discussed
in this article. See e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 535-47. Consistently, scholars have
supported controversial judicial review of rulemaking to counter some of these undesirable
effects. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 74, at 514-15.
333 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 7, for previous calls for regulatory restraint.
334 As one would do in her private life in order to overcome her biases. See, e.g.,
KAHNEMAN, supra note 145.
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transparency of goal and impact; a proposal that should guide both the
drafters and the users of examples. The article finally adds a few modest,
concrete proposals that would clearly and cheaply improve the process, and
support future study towards more nuanced guidance.
One cannot expect regulation drafting to be flawless, yet reasonable
drafting must meet certain expectations to serve its purpose. This article
argues the guidance it proposes would make the use of regulatory examples
more effective, contribute to the clarity of tax law in the United States, and
hopefully make it a bit less surreal.

